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Abstract: The American jury system holds the promise of bringing commonsense ideas 
about justice to the enforcement of the law. But its democratizing effect cannot be realized if 
a segment of the population faces systematic exclusion based on income or wealth. The 
problem of unequal access to jury service based on socio-economic disparities is a 
longstanding yet under-studied problem—and one which the uneven fallout of the COVID-19 
pandemic only exacerbated. Like race- and sex-based jury discrimination during the 
peremptory challenge phase of jury selection, the routine dismissal of citizens who face 
economic hardship excludes not only people but also the diversity of ideas, experiences, and 
frames of interpretation that characterize the American population. By failing to make sure that 
people who are poor can serve, we impoverish our shared understanding of doing justice. 
This Article offers a historical and empirical account of how socio-economic exclusion 
cuts prospective jurors from juries. It argues that the dominant rationale for such exclusion is 
a perception that poor and otherwise burdened prospective jurors should be excused from jury 
service for their own benefit. The effect of this superficially benevolent rationale, I argue, has 
been the concealment and reinforcement of class-based jury discrimination. The Article 
concludes that addressing this seemingly benign but exclusionary practice is an essential task 
for legal reformers, recognizing the relationship between race and class-based exclusion. 
Further, it recommends instituting structural changes that would make it possible for any 
eligible person to serve, regardless of income or wealth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lay participation in the legal system is regarded as an inviolable part 
of a participatory democracy.1 With the exception of exercising one’s 
right to vote, serving on a jury is arguably the most direct and powerful 
way to participate in the democratic process.2 In the United States, nearly 
40% of American citizens can expect to serve on a jury during their 
 
1. See Jeffrey L. Levin, Note, The Federal Jury Selection Act of 1968: A Critique, 2 COLUM. SURV. 
HUM. RTS. L. 52, 55–56 (1969–1970); Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 
829 (2015). 
2. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991). Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that jury 
service is a citizen’s “most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.” Justice 
Kavanaugh quoted this very line early in the 7–2 majority opinion he authored in Flowers v. 
Mississippi, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019). 
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lifetimes.3 In doing so, they exercise their right and fulfill their obligation 
to hear testimony, interpret evidence, and, in criminal cases, adjudicate 
the guilt of their peers.4 
And yet, the American jury system is plagued by a cruel irony: While 
poor people appear disproportionately as defendants in jury trials, they are 
also disproportionately excluded from jury service.5 This exclusion is not 
officially sanctioned. Rather, it occurs subtly during the period of 
questioning—referred to as voir dire—that precedes a juror’s 
empanelment.6 Though the substance of this questioning varies from one 
courtroom and case to the next,7 lawyers in general use their questions to 
evaluate the character and credibility of potential jurors. Empirical 
research, however, reveals that those who lack resources or have unstable 
living arrangements are often excused from jury service despite being 
otherwise qualified to participate.8 In some cases, prospective jurors fear 
they will lose their jobs or hourly wages. In others, they worry about how 
they will afford alternative caregiving arrangements for family members 
who are young, elderly, ill, or require supervision. Some doubt they can 
afford to commute to the courthouse or place jury service above 
other obligations. 
Each of these anxieties reflects a pernicious socio-economic inequality 
that fosters juries that reflect neither the demographic nor the class 
composition of American society. Building more representative juries no 
doubt requires undoing these inequalities—of class and race but also 
gender—more generally. As part of this process, it is essential to identify 
and reform exclusionary practices within the jury system itself. Though 
scholarship on jury discrimination has focused on racial bias on the part 
 
3. GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
CTS., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM 
REPORT 8 (2007), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264870713_The_State-of-the-
States_Survey_of_Jury_Improvement_Efforts_A_Compendium_Report (last visited Apr. 30, 2021). 
4. LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS 
OF CITIZENSHIP 128 (1998) (“Like voting, jury service is one of the basic rituals by which Americans 
affirm their participation in society. Unlike voting, it is a civil obligation; the citizen who does not 
respond to a summons to serve on a jury faces sanctions ranging from fines to contempt of court.”). 
5. See HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 64–65 (1993). See generally PETER EDELMAN, 
NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN AMERICA 115 (2017) (noting that 
exclusion from jury service is among the collateral consequences faced by those with criminal records 
who are also disproportionately poor). 
6. See FUKURAI ET AL., supra note 5, at 64–65. 
7. Janeen Kerper, The Art and Ethics of Jury Selection, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 123, 123–
24 (2000). 
8. Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Marc A. Musick, Selected to Serve: An Analysis of 
Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 33, 50 (2012). 
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of lawyers,9 a significant percentage of prospective jurors are cut from the 
jury selection process during the cause challenge phase of voir dire, before 
lawyers exercise their peremptory challenges.10 It is this period of 
assessing prospective jurors’ basic qualifications for jury service—
governed largely by trial judges’ discretion—that is the focus of 
this Article. 
In what follows, I offer historical, doctrinal, and original empirical 
analysis of income and wealth-based juror exclusion. My central 
argument is that the perpetuation of this exclusion is enabled by the 
widely-shared identification of hardship excusal with benevolence. This 
is a logic that frames jury participation as a financial burden from which 
the poor can—and should—be spared. But in “sparing” people who are 
poor, we foreclose the possibility of interrogating the system itself and 
asking critical questions: Can homogenous juries do justice in a 
heterogenous society? Is it inevitable that jury service constitutes a 
financial burden? How might prioritizing inclusion rather than exclusion 
remake juries, and with them, the American justice system? 
This Article illuminates the problem of benevolent exclusion to center 
these questions and argues for reforms that would renew the promise of 
the jury trial as a site of greater democratic participation.11 Part I traces 
the early origins of class-based jury exclusion beginning with the 
requirement that citizens own property as a condition for service. Turning 
to contemporary jury selection practice, Part II examines how cause 
challenges, often exercised by judges, facilitate the removal of jurors with 
claims of financial hardship. Drawing on novel empirical research, Part III 
presents a case study to examine the benevolent rationales that often guide 
judicial and attorney arguments to excuse jurors for cause. Finally, Part IV 
proposes structural changes aimed at promoting jury service regardless of 
a person’s socio-economic status. 
 
9. See Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1608 (2012); see also Catherine 
M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, Lawyers and Jurors: Interrogating Voir Dire Strategies by Analyzing 
Conversations, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 515, 541 (2019) (acknowledging that lawyers’ 
questioning strategies may stem from unconscious as well as conscious assumptions about jurors 
based on “demeanor, manner of dress, and other factors”). 
10. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Kami Chavis & Gregory S. Parks, The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury 
Selection Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 1423 (The researchers estimated that 
11% of prospective jurors in North Carolina were removed from felony trials “for cause” in 2011.). 
11. It is worth noting that full democratic participation in jury service is still precluded by current 
laws excluding, for example, those with criminal records. 
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I. THE LAW OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC JURY EXCLUSION 
A. Early Property Requirements 
An American citizen’s right to a trial by jury is notably the only 
constitutional guarantee that appears both in the U.S. Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights.12 The matter of who should constitute juries, however, was 
far narrower at the time of the country’s founding. In theory, American 
jury boxes were exclusively occupied by White,13 male property owners.14 
Yet, in practice the property requirement was less than stringent. For 
example, where the English jury’s property requirement meant that a mere 
quarter of the adult male population could participate, America’s less 
onerous standard meant that at least one half to three quarters of White 
male adults were eligible to participate as jurors.15 
In the United States, the struggle to eliminate the property requirement 
for jury service took over a century longer than the parallel effort to 
 
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, 
A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870 (1994). 
13. The editorial staff of the Washington Law Review has asked the authors to make explicit their 
rationales for capitalizing, or refraining from capitalizing, Black and White. For the purpose of this 
Article, and other recent work, see Anna Offit, Race-Conscious Jury Selection, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 
(forthcoming 2021). I choose to capitalize Black and White in recognition that neither racial category 
is neutral or natural, and that capitalization reflects the cultural and historical contingency of both 
Blackness and Whiteness in America. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for Capitalizing the B 
in Black, THE ATL. (June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-
capitalize-blackand-white/613159/ [https://perma.cc/FT5A-U39F]; see also Nell Irvin Painter, 
Opinion, Why ‘White’ Should Be Capitalized, Too, WASH. POST (July 22, 2020, 7:57 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/22/why-white-should-be-capitalized/ 
[https://perma.cc/3YR5-BDMD]. I applaud the Editors for inviting authors to interrogate the 
embedded power dynamics of what may once have been construed as a benign stylistic default. In 
this context, the pretense of grammatical neutrality and consistency is arguably a stance in and of 
itself. See ANN THÚY NGUYỄN & MAYA PENDLETON, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POL’Y, 
RECOGNIZING RACE IN LANGUAGE: WHY WE CAPITALIZE “BLACK” AND “WHITE” (2020), 
https://cssp.org/2020/03/recognizing-race-in-language-why-we-capitalize-black-and-white/ 
[https://perma.cc/949H-YPJP] (“We believe that it is important to call attention to White as a race as 
a way to understand and give voice to how Whiteness functions in our social and political institutions 
and our communities. Moreover, the detachment of “White” as a proper noun allows White people to 
sit out of conversations about race and removes accountability from White people’s and White 
institutions’ involvement in racism.”). My capitalization choice is consistent with the 2021 Chicago 
Manual of Style. See THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE ¶ 8.38 (17th ed. 2017). The Chicago Manual 
of Style is followed by the American Anthropological Association. See AAA STYLE GUIDE, AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N (2015), https://www.americananthro.org/StayInformed/Content.aspx? 
ItemNumber=2044 [https://perma.cc/LQK2-K2UW]. 
14. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 870. 
15. CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760–1860, 
at 5–14 (1st ed. 1960). The reason for this distinction, in general, was the relative affordability of 
American land which permitted a larger number of men to meet voter, and therefore juror, 
participation requirements.  
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abolish the property requirement for eligibility to vote.16 In both cases, 
advocates of property-based exclusion proffered the idea that the payment 
of taxes gave citizens a personal stake—and thus a right to participate—
in public institutions.17 In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
conventional wisdom suggested that allowing landless people to vote had 
two probable outcomes: Their lack of money and influence would prompt 
them to defer to the preferences of an employer or landlord,18 or their lack 
of deference would precipitate anarchy due to their perceived moral and 
intellectual limitations.19 Even White men would not be granted suffrage 
irrespective of wealth or status until Andrew Jackson’s presidency.20 As 
calls for expanded voting rights gained traction, there was resistance to 
loosening juror restrictions as new and popular reasoning for exclusion 
emerged: Jury service for the poor would harm not only society but the 
poor jurors for whom serving would constitute a threat to their 
livelihood.21 Conveniently, what had long seemed an act of malice 
became a form of charity. 
Still, for voting and jury service, benevolent exclusion did not replace 
the view that means indexed aptitude. In a 1966 dissenting opinion, for 
example, Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote that those in possession 
of property were more deeply invested in community affairs, and could 
be considered more responsible, educated, and knowledgeable than non-
property owners when it came to casting their vote.22 Though most states 
permitted all who were qualified to vote to become jurors, some included 
more nuanced qualifications for jury service, such as taxpaying, specific 
property requirements, or more indeterminate conditions like intelligence 
 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 5. 
18. Id. at 11 (The “true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in voters . . . is 
to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation as to be esteemed to have no will of their own.” 
(quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *171 (1893))). 
19. Id. (“The poor of both town and country might combine to attack property rights and pull down 
the pillars of the established order.”). 
20. Naomi Wulf, The Politics of Past and Progress in Jacksonian Democracy, 20 AM. 
TRANSCENDENTAL Q. 647, 647 (2006) (noting that all but three states eliminated their property 
requirements for White male voters by the mid-1820s); Donald Ratcliffe, The Right to Vote and the 
Rise of Democracy, 1787–1828, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 219 (2013). 
21. See, e.g., Gretchen Ritter, Jury Service and Women’s Citizenship Before and After the 
Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 479, 483 (2002) (discussing jury duty as a burden and 
in general discusses it as a separate political right from voting). 
22. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It is also 
arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage of 
Americans through most of our history, that people with some property have a deeper stake in 
community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, 
more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the community and Nation would be 
better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens.”).  
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and good character.23 Some states, including Georgia, had commensurate 
qualification requirements for jurors as for voters, while other states, like 
New York, had separate requirements for each.24 In Georgia, by 1798 
White, male, non-property owners who were eligible to vote were also 
qualified to serve as jurors.25 
In New York, by contrast, universal suffrage for White men was 
established in 1826 through the removal of most property and tax payment 
requirements for eligible voters.26 It was not until 1967, however, that a 
property requirement was eliminated for all prospective jurors.27 
Interestingly, New York’s property provision withstood a constitutional 
challenge in 1949 when a defendant filed a motion to dismiss a panel on 
the grounds that jurors faced systematic exclusion based on their racial, 
economic, or social status.28 In that case, the defendant claimed that the 
underrepresentation of manual laborers and poor people, among other 
groups, violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution.29 The judge, however, found these claims frivolous, 
and stated that “[a]ny attempt to secure such representation would not 
only result in chaos and confusion but, in my judgment, would inevitably 
breed the very intolerance which every right-minded person should be 
vigilant to avoid.”30 
Wherever property-based exclusion was allowed, however, it hardly 
functioned as the kind of absolute prohibition commonly faced by 
communities of color and women. In fact, property requirements were 
sometimes treated as a waivable prohibition: When jury venires fell short, 
non-property-owning, White men could be plucked off the street and 
ushered into courtrooms.31 Whiteness, in this respect, was used as a proxy 
 
23. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 2, 1811, § 4, 4 Del. Laws 444, 447 (1811) (requiring the sheriff to summon 
“sober, discreet and judicious freeholders, lawful men of fair characters”). 
24. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 879. 
25. Act of Feb. 9, 1797, § 27, reprinted in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 271, 
278 (Horatio Marbury & William H. Crawford eds., 1802). 
26. Act effective Sept. 1, 1967, ch. 49, § 1, 1967 N.Y. Laws 68 (amending the judiciary law relating 
to the qualifications of jurors). Admittedly, this was a small requirement, at $250, by the time it was 
removed. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See generally United States v. Foster, 83 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
29. Id. at 208.  
30. Id. 
31. See, e.g., Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 880 (“Just as formal eligibility for jury service 
did not always mean eligibility in fact, statutory disqualification did not always mean real 
disqualification. When qualified jurors failed to appear, statutes permitted court clerks or sheriffs to 
impanel unqualified ‘bystanders.’ In a number of jurisdictions, the nonappearance of qualified jurors 
and the use of bystanders was common.”).  
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for property even when legal criteria for ownership could not be met.32 In 
this manner, the “objective” standard of property ownership could be 
applied selectively to achieve racial or gendered exclusion without having 
to identify race or gender as the basis for removing certain groups from 
the jury pool. Married women, for example, were not allowed to control 
their own property, and all of their assets were considered their husband’s 
upon marriage.33 The 1887 Harland v. Territory34 case, for example, held 
that women could not validly serve on a grand jury due to “householder” 
requirements. In Washington Territory, in order to be a juror, one had to 
be both a qualified voter and a householder or property owner.35 While it 
had previously been thought that a husband and wife’s joint occupancy of 
a house meant both could be considered householders, the Territory’s 
Chief Justice clarified that only the husband was the householder, or head 
of house, and that no married woman could qualify as a property owner 
in this manner.36 
For Black people, the hurdle of property ownership was even more 
restrictive. Laws in all of the colonies prohibited enslaved Africans who 
entered the United States from owning property.37 And before the Civil 
War, many states even prohibited freed Black men from owning 
property38—a restriction that, alongside modern redlining, significantly 
hindered economic development for Black Americans.39 During 
Reconstruction, limiting Black access to property was a presidential 
priority, as President Andrew Johnson stymied General William 
Tecumseh Sherman’s proposal to give emancipated people the land on 
 
32. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1745 (1993) (“This 
articulation of rights that were contingent on property ownership was a familiar paradigm, as similar 
requirements had been imposed on the franchise in the early part of the republic. For the first two 
hundred years of the country’s existence, the system of racialized privilege in both the public and 
private spheres carried through this linkage of rights and inequality, and rights and property. 
Whiteness as property was the critical core of a system that affirmed the hierarchical relations between 
white and Black.”). 
33. Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A Research 
Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459, 462 (2002). Though 
legislation ended coverture practices at the state level in the mid to late nineteenth century, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out that holdover laws that reinforced the practice were not taken off 
the books until the women’s rights movement in the 1970s. See Allison Anna Tait, A Tale of Three 
Families: Historical Households, Earned Belonging, and Natural Connections, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 
1345, 1355 (2012). 
34. 3 Wash. Terr. 131 (1887). 
35. Id. at 159–61. 
36. Id. 
37. Roy W. Copeland, In the Beginning: Origins of African American Real Property Ownership in 
the United States, 44 J. BLACK STUD. 646, 646 (2013). 
38. Id. at 647. 
39. Id. 
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which they had previously worked without compensation.40 During the 
Jim Crow era, the passage of exclusionary Black codes in the South only 
created further barriers to the acquisition and retention of property by 
Black Americans.41 Among the many consequences of this legalized 
discrimination was the prevention of Black Americans from participating 
as lay decision-makers in a legal system already inclined to sanction or 
ignore their dispossession, discrimination, and death. 
B. The Key-Man System, The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 
and the Present 
By the 1960s, property requirements for jury service in the United 
States were moving toward full abolition.42 But even as more citizens 
became statutorily eligible to serve as jurors, the so-called “key-man” 
system remained an obstacle to their empanelment. The key-man system 
referred to the process by which sheriffs and county officials personally 
identified those eligible for jury service through assessments of character 
and suggestions by third parties.43 This process meant that while some 
citizens were regularly summoned for jury service, others—particularly 
women, people of color, and blue-collar workers—were left out.44 
Though jury commissioners theoretically sought jurors from each 
“segment” of the population, they exercised discretion to define and 
identify people who exhibited good moral character, integrity, and 
common sense.45 Resulting juries were disproportionately White, male, 
and employed in white-collar professions.46 In some cases, this 
 
40. Id. at 650; see also Nik Heynen, Toward an Abolition Ecology, 1 ABOLITION: J. INSURGENT 
POL. 240, 241–42 (2018) (“Present at this meeting were Sherman, Lincoln’s secretary of war, Edwin 
M. Stanton, and twenty African American leaders from within the Savannah community, many of 
whom were ministers. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss enacting emancipation and the 
political realities that would provide the foundation for Reconstruction. When Secretary Stanton 
asked the group of twenty men, ‘State in what manner you think you can take care of yourselves, and 
how can you best assist the Government in maintaining your freedom,’ Reverend Garrison Frazier 
replied, ‘The way we can best take care of ourselves is to have land, and turn it and till it by our 
labor—that is, by the labor of the women, and children, and old men—and we can maintain ourselves 
and have something to spare.’” (emphasis in original)). 
41. Copeland, supra note 37, at 654. 
42. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 870. 
43. See, e.g., id. at 879–80 (“The members of a group eligible for jury service might never serve, 
for jurors were not randomly summoned from among those eligible. Instead, public officials called 
selectmen, supervisors, trustees, or ‘sheriffs of the parish’ exercised what Tocqueville called ‘very 
extensive and very arbitrary’ powers in summoning jurors.” (quoting 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 359–60 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1945))).  
44. DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 233 (2016). 
45. Id. 
46. Id.  
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exclusionary outcome was not entirely the fault of the commissioners, 
who would attempt to find key-men in labor unions only to be told that 
members did not want to serve.47 
No case more clearly illustrates the key-man system’s exclusionary 
effects than Rabinowitz v. United States,48 from the Fifth Circuit, which 
featured a list of prospective jurors compiled by a jury commissioner in 
Albany, Georgia. The ostensible basis of the list was the commissioner’s 
identification of those who possessed good character, intelligence, and the 
ability to understand the cases typically tried in court.49 The jury 
commissioner testified in the case that “[a] lot of the additional names 
were the result of my own acquaintance, insofar as they were a result of 
suggestions by my friends whose opinions and integrity I valued,” and 
that his “acquaintance is generally predominantly, of course, with the 
White race.”50 Citizens of color and those of lower socio-economic status 
were disproportionately excluded from the jury pool.51 The commissioner 
conceded that he had not actually tried to confer with members of the 
Black community, including teachers, doctors, church congregants, or 
members of the local chapter of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).52 
The overt racial and socio-economic exclusion on the part of jury 
commissioners reflected by Rabinowitz precipitated public outrage and 
calls for reform.53 The result was the Jury Selection and Service Act of 
1968 (JSSA).54 Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland, who introduced five 
different bills on jury reform, was largely credited with the legislation’s 
success.55 Tydings’s bills proposed more inclusive methods of jury 
selection and aimed to enlarge jury pools as much as possible.56 The 
legislation declared unambiguously that it sought “to correct the racial and 
economic imbalances in federal jury composition and to establish uniform 
 
47. United States v. Foster, 83 F. Supp. 197, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (“[A]n official of the American 
Federation of Labor refused, according to the testimony, to supply any lists of union members as 
prospective jurors because his men ‘wanted to have nothing to do with juries.’”). 
48. 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).  
49. Id. at 37. 
50. Id. at 40. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 37–42. The opinion, and portions of Mr. Simmons’s testimony, were reprinted in the 
Senate Committee Hearings Report. Federal Jury Selection: Hearings on S. 383, S. 384, S. 385, 
S. 386, S. 387, S. 989, and S. 1319 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Jud. Mach. of the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 484 (1967) [hereinafter Judicial Machinery Hearings]. 
53. S. REP. NO. 90-891, at 10–11 (1967); H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 4 (1968). 
54. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–69. 
55. S. REP. NO. 90-891, at 12; 113 CONG. REC. 587–89 (1967). 
56. S. REP. NO. 90-891, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 3. 
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selection procedures.”57 
To achieve this objective, the JSSA inaugurated a series of significant 
and innovative changes to the American jury system, and to federal courts 
in particular. For instance, it made clear that any requirements for jury 
service outlined by Congress, including those related to citizenship, age, 
or residence, would be authoritative.58 District courts, by contrast, would 
be expected to develop “detailed procedures” to “ensure the random 
selection of a fair cross section of the persons residing in the 
community.”59 Still, district courts would not be left to their own devices. 
Congress encouraged district courts to compile lists of eligible jurors from 
multiple sources,60 because reliance on telephone lists could exclude those 
in poorer households.61 Congressional committee reports also voiced 
concern that jury commissioners who only utilized voter registration 
records would disparately summon politically engaged or highly 
educated citizens.62 
In addition to calling for diverse source lists, Congress identified 
jurors’ paltry compensation as a significant practical barrier to broad 
 
57. Laura Rose Handman, Case Comment, Underrepresentation of Economic Groups on Federal 
Juries, 57 B.U. L. REV. 198, 201 (1977). 
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (“In making such determination the chief judge of the district court, 
or such other district court judge as the plan may provide . . . shall deem any person qualified to serve 
on grand and petit juries in the district court unless he—(1) is not a citizen of the United States 
eighteen years old who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district; (2) is unable 
to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out 
satisfactorily the juror qualification form; (3) is unable to speak the English language; (4) is incapable, 
by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service; or (5) has a charge 
pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record 
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not 
been restored.”). 
59. Id. § 1863(b)(3). 
60. Judicial Machinery Hearings, supra note 52, at 213 (statement of Professor Edwin S. Mills, 
Professor of Economics, John Hopkins University) (explaining how the key-man system created an 
economic bias, and solutions to that bias). 
61. Id. at 131, 374 (statements of Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, University of Chicago Law 
School, and Hon. Donald P. Lay, Judge at United States Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit). 
62. Id. at 67 (statement of Dale W. Broeder, Esquire, of Dundee, Michigan). In fact, Dale W. 
Broeder, who was the attorney who had started the University of Chicago Jury Project in 1959, 
specifically stated in testimony that “use of voting records likewise discriminates against the 
uneducated and the poor,” adding that those groups of people were substantially underrepresented at 
the polls, and were, in fact, an overlapping group. Id. Particularly striking in his testimony was his 
statement that 
[i]t is to me one of the ironies of all these bills that we commonly say that the jury system allows 
a criminal defendant to be judged by his peers—and I’m not talking about peers who also happen 
to be criminals either—while we make substantial though perhaps unintentional efforts to ensure 
that the socioeconomic groups from which most of our criminal defendants come will typically 
be judged by people with a lineage more honorable and distinguished. 
Id. 
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participation.63 To remedy the situation, the juror pay rate was raised from 
$4 per day to $20 per day in federal court, which today would be the 
equivalent of increasing juror pay from $30 to $150 per day.64 Legislative 
comments on the bill suggested there was even an iteration of the 
legislation that sought to compensate jurors for lost income, if this figure 
exceeded the $20 per day default.65 A striking aspect of this part of the 
reform was its stated intent. For Congress in 1968, the goal of increasing 
juror compensation was to find a rate commensurate with the wages of a 
working-class person.66 Tellingly, this level of juror compensation has 
failed to keep pace with the rate of inflation and today is nowhere near 
average wages, or even a “living wage.”67 
Another notable feature of the JSSA’s attention to jury reform was its 
recognition of the interconnectedness of socio-economic and racial 
exclusion.68 Testimony before the committee emphasized that the key-
man system’s pronounced economic biases constituted the greatest 
impediment to Black peoples’ participation on juries.69 Undoing 
economic exclusion was thus viewed as a means of creating juries that 
were also more reflective of the United States’ racial diversity. Even so, 
significant racial and gender discrimination in jury selection persisted and 
has since been the subject of numerous cases, from Strauder v. West 
Virginia70 to Flowers v. Mississippi.71 The former held that barring Black 
citizens from jury service violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.72 The latter held that the doctrine articulated in 
 
63. Id. at 216 (statements of Leon Ricassi, Esquire, on behalf of Theodore I. Kaskoff, Esquire, of 
the American Trial Lawyers Association). 
64. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–274, § 102(a), 82 Stat. 62 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1871); Value  of  $20  in  1968,  SAVING.ORG,  https://www.saving.org/ 
inflation/inflation.php?amount=20&year=1968 [https://perma.cc/ZS2D-ENWC]. 
65. Judicial Machinery Hearings, supra note 52, at 5 (reproducing draft of S. 384). 
66. Id. at 216 (statements of Leon Ricassi, Esquire, on behalf of Theodore I. Kaskoff, Esquire, of 
the American Trial Lawyers Association). 
67. Id. In 2019, a living wage for a family of four was $16.54 per hour, or $132.32 per day for an 
eight-hour work day. Carey Ann Nadeau, Mass. Inst. of Tech., A Calculation of the Living Wage, 
LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR (Mar. 3, 2020), https://livingwage.mit.edu/articles/61-new-living-wage-
data-for-now-available-on-the-tool [https://perma.cc/4XLQ-GFV3]. 
68. S. REP. NO. 90-891, at 15 (1967) (noting that the JSSA arose from reforms suggested during 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1967). 
69. Judicial Machinery Hearings, supra note 52, at 172–73, 543, 569 (testimony of Kalven and 
Zeisel) (reprinting of Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (1966)). 
70. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
71. 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019). 
72. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. 
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Batson v. Kentucky,73 barring race-based discrimination during voir dire,74 
was misapplied in a high-profile Mississippi murder prosecution.75 
Though typically inscribed into the long legal history of racial 
discrimination and its undoing, the interrelatedness of class and race in 
the United States requires that both be viewed as central to efforts to 
combat socio-economic jury exclusion. 
The history of socio-economic exclusion in the American jury system 
is the history of the jury system itself. From property requirements to the 
key-man system, the affluence and corresponding social status of citizens 
has long been a hallmark of their eligibility to participate in civic life. 
Although Congress and the states have made progress in the formal 
abolition of property requirements, the effects of affluence and income 
remain determinative of jury participation.76 Understanding the continued 
salience of socio-economic exclusion thus requires a nuanced study of 
contemporary law and the process of jury empanelment. 
II. THE PROCESS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC JURY EXCLUSION 
A. Cause Challenges Are an Understudied Mechanism for Juror 
Exclusion 
The process by which ordinary people are empaneled as jurors is one 
that is stacked, at every turn, against the poor. The first exclusionary 
juncture lies at the creation of source lists from which jurors are 
summoned to court.77 Though the JSSA attempted to make such rolls 
more inclusive, many states today use Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV)-generated lists limited to those with a driver’s license, registered 
voters, or those with a voting record.78 In an effort to expand these lists, 
California may soon become the latest state, joining seventeen before it, 
to include tax records as a way to access a broader sample of eligible 
 
73. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
74. Id. at 96–100. 
75. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2274. 
76. See, e.g., Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury 
and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 238, 273 (1994) (concluding that “socioeconomic 
barriers preventing full community participation” are among the determinants of “racially 
demarcated juries”). 
77. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 129 (1940). The case ultimately determined that the source list, 
compiled by the key-man system, resulted in underrepresentation of people of color.  
78. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF VT., PLAN FOR THE RANDOM SELECTION OF GRAND 
AND PETIT JURORS FOR SERVICE WITHIN THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT 1 (2019) (using primarily the 
voter registration list, supplemented by DMV records). 
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jurors.79 Still, as long as people who are poor are underrepresented in these 
expanded source lists, the process of assembling juror lists will remain a 
site of exclusion. 
The next point of attrition for prospective jurors who face financial 
hardship, after source lists are compiled and jurors are summoned, is their 
arrival to court. On average, 9% of summoned jurors will fail to respond 
to their summonses—with a rate in some states as high as 50%.80 Though 
some judges have attempted to enforce compliance by issuing warrants 
for “Failure to Appear” or putting a lien on the property of those who do 
not show up, this approach is by no means universal.81 Upon receipt of a 
summons, prospective jurors can often respond with proof that there is a 
reason they should not appear in court in advance of their date of service.82 
Jurors can also seek excusal from jury service by completing written 
questionnaires which they can submit to the court by mail in advance.83 
Jurors may also be dismissed from service after reporting to court in 
person. Though it is possible for an attorney to challenge the composition 
of a jury panel, or venire,84 in practice there are two predominant ways 
that jurors are relieved of their duty: Through peremptory challenges and 
 
79. Adam Beam, Bill Would Add Taxpayers to List for Juries in California, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWS (July 15, 2020), https://apnews.com/c13e59b237ac9ad1c67d179f458c8508 [https://perma.cc/ 
9DQK-AUGB]. 
80. Maxine Bernstein, Judges Cracking Down on People Who Snub Jury Duty, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWS (May 21, 2017), https://apnews.com/62b279c38615469fb9bee505c9c66ff5/Judges-cracking-
down-on-people-who-snub-jury-duty [https://perma.cc/6R45-BT83]. In Houston, Texas, for 
example, only one in four summoned jurors have reportedly appeared for service. Samantha Ketterer, 
Battling the Jury Duty Problem, Where Fewer Than 1 in 4 Show Up, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Battling-the-jury-duty-
problem-where-fewer-than-15010187.php [https://perma.cc/8SHV-N3GA]. Fulton County, where 
the city of Atlanta is located, has also reported a no-show rate of 50%. Johnny Edwards, In a First, 
Fulton Holds Jury No-Shows Accountable, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 10, 2012), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/first-fulton-holds-jury-shows-accountable/NqeoXYrCX55o 
SMHfdQ9x2L/ [https://perma.cc/WNP5-2487].  
81. Colleen McMahon & David L. Kornblau, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye’s Program of Jury 
Selection Reform in New York, 10 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 263 (1995). 
82. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-10 (West 2020) (asking jurors to complete and submit a 
sworn statement about their financial hardship concerns); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-313 (2019) 
(allowing for affidavits based on vacations and illness in addition to hardship). 
83. Samuel R. Sommers, Determinants and Consequences of Jury Racial Diversity: Empirical 
Findings, Implications, and Directions for Future Research, 2 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 65, 
81 (2008). 
84. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 209 (2021) (noting that such a challenge relates to a “prejudicial defect 
or irregularity” in the selection of jurors summoned to court (citing Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 
250 P.2d 586 (Ariz. 1952) (holding that the summoning of jurors had not been carried out at adequate 
intervals))); State v. Jackson, 125 S.E.2d 474, 476 (S.C. 1962) (challenging a court clerk’s 
constitution of a venire constrained by the jury box’s size).  
Offit (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2021  10:34 AM 
2021] BENEVOLENT EXCLUSION 627 
 
through cause challenges.85 Both routes of juror excusal take place during 
an extended period of juror questioning, known as voir dire, during which 
attorneys and judges question jurors about their ability to serve.86 
Cause challenges, which can be exercised by judges without restriction, 
are the first and most significant means by which racial disparities are 
introduced to empaneled juries.87 One function of the cause challenge is 
to excuse citizens the judge believes harbor biases that might prevent them 
from fairly and impartially assessing evidence.88 Recognizing that one’s 
right to an impartial jury is an integral part of the American legal system,89 
cause challenges are perceived to be an essential strategic resource for 
litigants;90 they promote the removal of jurors who appear as though they 
cannot follow legal instructions or assess evidence fairly.91 
In practice, judges dismiss jurors for cause for a variety of reasons. In 
the federal context, for example, Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which governs jury selection, has widely been interpreted as 
affording judges broad discretion to determine the parameters and types 
of questions asked of prospective jurors.92 In civil cases, judges exercise 
similar discretion to identify prospective jurors who might have a 
 
85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. 
86. Wright et al., supra note 10, at 1411. 
87. See id.; see also Will Craft, How Did Curtis Flowers End Up with a Nearly All-White Jury, 
APM REPS. (June 5, 2018), https://features.apmreports.org/in-the-dark/Curtis-flowers-trial-six-jury-
selection/ [https://perma.cc/5J32-F8W3] (describing the demographic impact of jurors’ removal, for 
cause, during Curtis Flowers’s prosecution). 
88. See, e.g., 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 193 (2021) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 
(9th Cir. 2000)) (describing challenges to jurors for cause). Challenges for cause are the means by 
which partial or biased jurors should be eliminated. Id.; Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1111; see, e.g., ALA. 
CODE § 12-16-152 (2020) (disqualifying for cause those who would refuse to impose the death 
penalty in a capital punishment case or those who are biased against penitentiary punishment); TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.105 (West 2020) (disqualifying for cause those who for various reasons may 
be biased in a particular case). 
89. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; Paenitz v. Commonwealth, 820 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1991) 
(noting that “[there are] some constitutional rights . . . so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error” (quoting Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987))). 
90. Sorter v. Austen, 129 So. 51, 52 (Ala. 1930) (noting that “the right to challenge for cause is 
inherent in the right of trial by an impartial jury”); 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 193 (2021) (“A prosecutor, 
and indeed any party, is entitled to challenge prospective jurors for cause.” (citing People v. Sánchez, 
375 P.3d 812, 837 (Cal. 2016))). 
91. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (noting that “[w]ithout an adequate 
voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially 
to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled”). 
92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; see, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 140 (1974) (“[T]he trial 
judge made a general inquiry into the jurors’ general views concerning obscenity. Failure to ask 
specific questions as to the possible effect of educational, political, and religious biases did ‘not reach 
the level of a constitutional violation,’ nor was it error requiring the exercise of our supervisory 
authority over the administration of justice in the federal courts.” (citation omitted)). 
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prejudicial personal relationship with an attorney or party in a case.93 To 
the extent that a prospective juror has adverse interests that involve a party 
in the case, or a suit pending in the same court involving similar questions 
of fact, the removal of such jurors for cause is also common.94 
In addition to addressing potential sources of bias, cause challenges are 
used to excuse jurors who fail to meet legal qualifications to participate.95 
Though restrictions on eligibility vary by jurisdiction, they generally 
require American citizenship and residency in the county from which one 
is summoned, a minimum and maximum age, English language 
proficiency, and the absence of a prior felony conviction.96 Of particular 
significance, judges also frequently exercise cause challenges to remove 
jurors who indicate that financial impediments would constrain their 
ability to serve as jurors.97 Jurisdictional hardship guidance, however, 
does not provide a precise or consistent definition of financial hardship. 
In the federal context, jurors seeking direction from the U.S. Courts 
Administrative Office in Washington, D.C., which maintains a website, 
can expect to find little helpful information. The site notes that under the 
Jury Act, courts can excuse jurors on the basis of “undue hardship or 
extreme inconvenience,” which can be requested in writing.98 The criteria 
for seeking such an excuse, however, are not specified. 
Assessments of hardship excuses, among other rationales for a cause 
dismissal, lie at the sole discretion of the judge.99 Cause challenge 
determinations are also rarely appealed, as the standard of review is abuse 
of discretion.100 The next Part of this Article will demonstrate that judges’ 
 
93. THOMSON REUTERS, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: SELECTION OF JURORS (database 
updated April 2020) (available on Westlaw).  
94. Id. 
95. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 193 (2021) (“[C]hallenge for cause is the appropriate method for 
objection to a prospective juror on the ground that he or she does not have the qualifications required 
by the statute governing jury service.” (citing People v. Thomas, 533 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (Sup. Ct. 
1988))); AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 13–14 (2005) [hereinafter ABA 
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
american_jury/principles.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK6R-3PTG] (stating that “[a]t a 
minimum, a challenge for cause to a juror should be sustained if the juror has an interest in the 
outcome of the case, may be biased for or against one of the parties, is not qualified by law to serve 
on a jury, has a familial relation to a participant in the trial, or may be unable or unwilling to hear the 
subject case fairly and impartially”). 
96. See ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES, supra note 95, at 13 (providing a model for such principles). 
97. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-103 (West 2021) (excusing for cause those who assert that 
the state of their health requires absence from jury service); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a) (2019) 
(excusing jurors for cause upon a finding of extreme hardship). 
98. Juror Qualifications, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/juror-
qualifications [https://perma.cc/A2P6-MYDA]. 
99. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483 (2008).  
100. Id. 
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cause challenge determinations are highly variable, with some showing 
deference to jurors’ concerns, and others insisting that financial hardship 
should not warrant excusal.101 Lawyers who wish to preserve an error for 
argument on appeal are thus sometimes required to use peremptory 
challenges to excuse jurors they feel should have been removed 
for cause.102 
Unlike peremptory challenges, which are limited in number and subject 
to anti-discrimination law,103 cause challenges are theoretically 
limitless.104 And the dismissal of prospective jurors for reasons of 
financial hardship, though seemingly benevolent, can effectively purge 
the venire of jurors who defense attorneys view as advantageous to their 
clients.105 In one case, for example, a defendant argued—
unsuccessfully—that hardship challenges were used to selectively remove 
Black prospective jurors with childcare commitments, even as White 
prospective jurors raised the same concern.106 This practice recalls the 
selective application of property requirements to fill venires with non-
propertied White prospective jurors and serves as an important reminder 
that any discussion of undoing socio-economic exclusion is in the United 
States also a discussion of undoing race-based exclusion. 
B. Cause Challenge Dismissals Disparately Exclude Jurors of Color 
Judges’ uses of cause challenges to excuse prospective jurors who raise 
hardship concerns results in juries that are socio-economically and 
racially homogenous. Past studies have focused on the extent to which 
inquiries into juror bias can lead to the disparate dismissal of jurors of 
color—sometimes based on past criminal convictions107 or even arrest 
records.108 It is particularly notable, in light of the American jury system’s 
 
101. David Ferrara, ‘We’ve Heard Every Excuse’ for Ducking Jury Service, Nevada Judges Say, 
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/weve-
heard-every-excuse-for-ducking-jury-service-nevada-judges-say/ [https://perma.cc/W8YJ-UHQS].  
102. William G. Childs, The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges, Challenges for Cause, and 
Harmless Error, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 49, 55 (1999). 
103. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that the state’s “privilege to strike 
individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal 
Protection Clause”). 
104. People v. Mickey, 818 P.2d 84, 108 (Cal. 1991) (“[A] total of 325 prospective jurors and 235 
hardship excusals.”). 
105. People v. Gray, 118 P.3d 496, 508 (Cal. 2005). 
106. Id. at 511. 
107. Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 592, 602 (2013). 
108. Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Violates 
Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 389 (2016). 
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fraught racial history, that the racialized experience of poverty has been 
absent from scholarship on jury demographics while featuring so 
prominently in hearings on the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.109 
According to the Pew Research Center, White families in the United 
States have a net worth that is on average thirteen times greater than that 
of families of color.110 The poverty rate among Black and Hispanic 
Americans in 2019 was 18.8% and 15.7%, respectively, as compared to 
the 7.3% poverty rate among non-Hispanic White Americans.111 White 
citizens are also more likely than citizens of color to own their own cars112 
and homes.113 The consequences of this disparity for jury 
representativeness cannot be overlooked. One variable that may account 
for disparate juror summons response rates, for example, is the fact that 
renters tend to live at an address for shorter periods of time and may fail 
to update the address on their driver’s license each time they move—both 
of which lead to less inclusive juror lists.114 
Research suggests that disparities in the number of individuals who 
report for jury service, based on race, often correspond to concern about 
the financial consequences of participating.115 In Dallas, Texas, in the 
early 2000s, for example, The Dallas Morning News and SMU Law 
Review conducted a comprehensive study of jury participation in the 
county.116 According to that study, four out of five people summoned for 
 
109. Judicial Machinery Hearings, supra note 52, at 67 (statement of Dale W. Broeder, Esquire, 
of Dundee, Michigan). 
110. In 2013, for example, White families had an average net worth of $144,200, and Black families 
had an average net worth of $11,200. PEW RSCH. CTR., SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS: 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING (2016), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 
2016/06/27/1-demographic-trends-and-economic-well-being/ [https://perma.cc/459T-JM53]. 
111. JESSICA SEMEGA, MELISSA KOLLAR, EMILY A. SHRIDER & JOHN F. CREAMER, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, P60-270, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2019, at 15 (2020), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-270.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3ZM5-KT9R]. 
112. See ALAN BERUBE, ELIZABETH DEAKIN & STEVEN RAPHAEL, SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFERENCES 
IN HOUSEHOLD AUTOMOBILE OWNERSHIP RATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR EVACUATION POLICY (2006), 
https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/berubedeakenraphael.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7QNG-WK9G]; see also Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll, Can Boosting Minority 
Car-Ownership Rates Narrow Inter-Racial Employment Gaps? 101 (U.C. Berkeley, Berkeley 
Program on Hous. & Urb. Pol’y, Working Paper No. W00-002, 2001), https://escholarship.org/uc/ 
item/4k4519pw#main [https://perma.cc/X2MG-KQ4Y].  
113. Svenja Gudell, Why the Black and White Homeownership Gap Hasn’t Changed Much in 100 
Years, CNN BUS. (June 15, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/15/perspectives/housing-
discrimination/index.html [https://perma.cc/GD7F-UQN5] (“Nearly 75% of white households own 
their homes, compared with just 44% of black households.”). 
114. Sommers, supra note 83, at 69–70.  
115. Rose et al., supra note 8, at 37. 
116. Robert C. Walters, Michael D. Marin & Mark Curriden, Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled 
Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 320 (2005). 
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jury service did not show up, and Hispanic residents in particular were 
under-represented.117 In a county in which more than one in four citizens 
was Hispanic during the period in question, only one in fourteen jury 
service participants was Hispanic.118 And while 40% of the population 
lived in households earning $35,000 or less, only 13% of this population 
participated in jury service.119 
Beyond this data, which suggest that jury no-shows may stem, in part, 
from citizens’ concerns about the financial consequences of 
participation,120 research participants completed surveys that revealed 
striking disparities. In particular, twice as many Hispanic respondents as 
White respondents found it difficult to spend time away from work during 
jury duty, and more than 19% of Hispanic persons and 17% of Black 
Americans earned no wages if they reported to court for jury service, 
compared to 5% of White citizens surveyed.121 
There is evidence that the economic impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic has exacerbated the racial and socio-economic disparities that 
continue to plague juries. A June 2020 informal survey of potential jurors 
in Dallas and Houston, for example, indicated that more Black and 
Hispanic potential jurors reported economic hardships if summoned for 
jury duty, and were also more likely to work in hospitals or other areas of 
increased viral exposure.122 When a Zoom-based virtual jury was later 
summoned for a criminal trial in Travis County, Texas, which 
encompasses the city of Austin, 73% of empaneled jurors self-reported 
their race as White and 83% self-reported having a post-graduate or 
college degree.123 U.S. Census data indicates, in contrast, that fewer than 
50% of Travis County residents are either White or possess 
advanced degrees.124 
This research demonstrates that legal scholars committed to 
eliminating racism from the American legal system must confront socio-
economic disparities and their attendant forms of exclusion in our juries. 





120. Id. at 330–31. 
121. Id.  
122. Tillotson Law Survey: COVID-19 Dramatically Impacts Dallas, Houston Jury Pools, 
TILLOTSON L. (June 25, 2020), https://www.tillotsonlaw.com/news/tillotson-law-survey-covid-19-
dramatically-impacts-dallas-houston-jury-pools/ [https://perma.cc/2X3X-HKWH]. 
123. Jennifer Lapinski, Robert Hirschhorn & Lisa Blue, Zoom Jury Trials: The Idea Vastly Exceeds 
the Technology, NEWS.LAW (Aug. 25, 2020), https://news.law/zoom-jury-trials-the-idea-vastly-
exceeds-the-technology/ [https://perma.cc/QK7V-3LFU]. 
124. Id. 
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peremptory challenges are exercised; even in the absence of explicit racial 
animus or bias, financial hardship stands as a persistent obstacle to 
representative jury participation. 
The consequences of this are significant. In addition to violating a 
person’s constitutional right to serve as a juror,125 the functional exclusion 
of people of color undermines public confidence in the jury trial,126 as well 
as in the accuracy of verdicts.127 In fact, empirical research suggests that 
jury deliberations are less satisfying for poor and historically 
underrepresented jurors, including those who are Black and Hispanic, 
than for White jurors regardless of class.128 In Taylor v. Louisiana,129 the 
Supreme Court specifically noted that public confidence in the trial 
system depended on the perceived fairness of jury selection procedures 
that ensured the broadest levels of participation possible.130 
While public confidence is a worthy goal in and of itself, the stakes of 
jury exclusion may be greatest for criminal defendants. There is an 
abundance of psychological research, for example, indicating that 
deliberative bodies with broad representation have longer and more 
substantive discussions of evidence due to the confluence of different 
perspectives.131 Another study found that jury demographics affected 
participation during deliberation: All-White (mock) juries tend to be 
dominated by White males while White females are less talkative and 
perceived as less persuasive.132 When jurors of color were introduced to 
the mock panel, this dynamic changed; women became more active 
participants and their contributions were more impactful.133 
With respect to guilty verdicts, a study has shown that White jurors are 
more likely to convict than Black jurors in cases involving Black 
 
125. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986). 
126. Sommers, supra note 83, at 79–82. 
127. Jordan Abshire & Brian H. Bornstein, Juror Sensitivity to the Cross-Race Effect, 27 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 471, 471 (2003). 
128. Alix S. Winter & Matthew Clair, Jurors’ Subjective Experiences of Deliberations in Criminal 
Cases, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1458, 1463, 1480 (2017) (“[I]n the context of jury deliberations, 
being black with a lower level of education is qualitatively different from being white with a lower 
level of education. This differing effect of class by race has previously been found with respect to 
incarceration as well as with respect to residential neighborhoods but we find that it is also the case 
in the context of interpersonal interaction.” (citations omitted)). 
129. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
130. Id. at 530–31. 
131. See Sommers, supra note 83, at 86.  
132. Negin R. Toosi, Samuel R. Sommers & Nalini Ambady, Getting a Word in Group-Wise: 
Effects of Racial Diversity on Gender Dynamics, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1150, 
1154 (2012). 
133. Id.  
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defendants on trial for violent crimes.134 This may result, in part, from 
Black jurors’ greater awareness (and experience) with the inequities of the 
criminal justice system.135 It may also result from the prejudicial 
tendencies of predominantly White juries. 
Studies have also highlighted the varying effect of jury demographics 
on the outcomes of different types of criminal cases.136 One such study, 
based on North Carolina data, determined that juries with more than one 
Black male member were more likely to acquit defendants.137 White 
juries, in contrast, were found to more often convict Black defendants in 
cases with White victims.138 Scholars have also highlighted instances in 
which reliance on racial stereotypes about jurors’ likely sympathies when 
empaneling jurors of color have been unfounded and prejudicial in and of 
themselves.139 Ensuring that jurors from diverse backgrounds are 
empaneled thus not only improves the public perception of the legal 
system, but influences the deliberative process by effectuating a more 
fulsome and measured review of evidence. 
The foregoing shows that despite a record of demonstrable progress, 
the American jury system remains vulnerable to socio-economic 
exclusion. Keeping people who are poor out of venires deepens the 
marginalization of already underrepresented groups, resulting in juries 
that are neither socio-economically nor racially representative of 
American society. This is an affront to the Constitution which, under 
Batson, protects a person’s right to serve as a juror.140 It also prevents 
empaneled jurors from feeling that they can speak and be heard. But a 
review of the ideal-typical process141 of assessing and challenging jurors 
 
134. Abshire & Bornstein, supra note 127, at 477. 
135. Id. at 473.  
136. Randall A. Gordon, Thomas A. Bindrim, Michael L. McNicholas & Teresa L. Walden, 
Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effect of Defendant Race on Simulated 
Juror Decisions, 128 J. SOC. PSYCH. 191, 195 (1988) (observing that White jurors often view white 
collar crimes, such as embezzlement, as more serious than blue collar crimes, such as burglary). 
137. See Wright et al., supra note 10, at 1430. 
138. See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than the 
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 
1082 (2011). 
139. See Sommers, supra note 83, at 74–75 (This article discusses a case in which a defense 
attorney’s empanelment of a Black juror relied on the unfounded assumption, based on race, that the 
juror was likely to be sympathetic to the Black defendant. The juror at issue made racially biased 
statements, offering grounds for the defendant’s appeal.).  
140. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1986).  
141. An “ideal type,” as famously conceived by sociologist Max Weber, refers to a social 
phenomenon stripped of its local or empirical specificity for purposes of analysis. See generally Max 
Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 49, 90 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949). 
Offit (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2021  10:34 AM 
634 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:613 
 
does not offer a full picture of how things unfold in practice. 
In Part III, I draw on my own extended empirical studies of jury 
selection to offer an innovative look at socio-economic exclusion in real 
time. In particular, I identify the central role that benevolence plays as a 
common rationale for exclusion. In the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries the link between property, ability, and moral aptitude served to 
make socio-economic exclusion not only thinkable to its advocates but 
right and good. 
Today, I argue, the view of jury service as an impossible burden for 
those who are poor, and excusal from it as an act of benevolence, once 
more makes exclusion of certain people not only thinkable but right and 
good. Further, as I will discuss in the final section of this Article, the view 
of jury service as a burden for people who are poor and excusal as an act 
of benevolence reifies the jury system as something unchangeable, rather 
than a living system in which the financial consequences of service might 
be reduced, eliminated, or turned positive, by compensating jurors at a 
level that befits the importance of the service they render. 
III. AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY OF JUDICIAL AND 
ATTORNEY MANAGEMENT OF HARDSHIP EXCUSES 
The last section examined the legal mechanisms through which 
otherwise eligible jurors are excused from jury service due to economic 
hardship. Missing from this account, however, is discussion or analysis of 
the real-time process by which lawyers and judges use and rationalize 
cause challenges to excuse jurors who explicitly or implicitly identify 
themselves as financially burdened by jury service. What will become 
clear is that while judges manage cause challenges quite differently, it is 
possible to discern patterns in their practices of juror questioning and 
dismissal based on their twin desires to be benevolent and yet also vigilant 
in their empanelment of juries. Uncovering this, however, requires a shift 
to a qualitative empirical perspective from traditional legal analysis. Thus, 
the section that follows continues the foregoing discussion of socio-
economic exclusion by synthesizing findings from court observations and 
semi-structured interviews over a seven-year period. 
A. Methods 
This section presents findings from an empirical study carried out 
between 2013 and 2020 with the support of the National Science 
Foundation. This field research, which took place in state and federal 
courtrooms and prosecutors’ offices, contributed to a long-term study 
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focused on the role of jurors in prosecutors’ decision-making.142 The study 
consisted of participation in thirty jury selection proceedings in state and 
federal court143 and semi-structured interviews with thirty Assistant 
District Attorneys, thirty Assistant U.S. Attorneys, thirty federal public 
defenders, and thirty state public defenders about their experiences with 
and approaches to voir dire. 
Though the case names associated with the jury selection proceedings 
analyzed in this section have been de-identified to preserve the anonymity 
of the attorneys and judges involved, they include a range of civil and 
criminal cases—from car accidents and healthcare fraud to prosecutions 
of alleged public corruption, rape, child abuse, and drug trafficking. I 
selected the state and federal districts of such jury selection proceedings 
and interviews for their variable population density, racial diversity, and 
comparatively high level of socio-economic inequality. 
As the study focuses on two anonymized judicial districts in distinct 
regions of the United States, it is fair to question the applicability of its 
findings to other jurisdictions. My response is first, that this study is aimed 
at shedding light on a broader phenomenon by building on other empirical 
legal and doctrinal scholarship. Through its complementarity with other 
research, this study creates a more fulsome understanding of the impacts 
of cause challenges and effects of socio-economic exclusion. Second, the 
central focus of this study is the identification and explication of particular 
mechanisms and processes of jury selection. To this end, I aim to offer 
insight into the ways dismissals of prospective jurors due to economic 
hardship enlarge the scope of judicial and attorney discretion to prevent 
otherwise eligible jurors from serving. These findings present an avenue 
for future research in other settings which might confirm or contest their 
validity. My confidence in their generalizability stems from the broad 
similarity of jurors’ eligibility criteria across the United States and the 
robustness of the study itself. With over 100 interviews over a seven-year 
research period, my study offers ample evidence that judges and lawyers 
utilize a shared discursive and practical toolkit to assess and grant excuses 
or exemptions to jurors who present hardship excuses in court. 
With few exceptions, empirical studies of the exclusionary character of 
jury selection practices typically focus on the demographics of empaneled 
 
142. See generally Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1071 
(2019) (This study examines the role that hypothetical jurors play in federal prosecutors’ case 
preparation.). 
143. To the extent that quotations appear in this Article, they have been modified. Their purpose is 
to tease out formulations that emerged as generalizable and representative of prosecutors who 
grappled with similar strategic and ethical concerns in preparing for jury selection. 
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(or excused) jurors.144 My research, by contrast, builds on a different, 
processual approach, drawing on interviews with former jurors145 and 
lawyers146 to connect off-transcript deliberations about voir dire147 to the 
production of unrepresentative jury pools and panels. This scholarship 
uses qualitative data to illuminate the norms, beliefs, routines, and other 
features of professional behavior among legal actors that account for how 
a diverse public is actively sorted into less diverse juries in state and 
federal court.148 What distinguishes my approach is both its attention to 
multiple perspectives and its long duration: Through extensive participant 
observation149 and interviews with 120 actors across four groups, it offers 
an unparalleled look at the production of socio-economic exclusion in the 
contemporary United States. 
  
 
144. Cf. Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, Lawyers and Jurors: Interrogating Voir Dire 
Strategies by Analyzing Conversations, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 515, 524 (2019) (Drawing on 
transcript analysis, the authors note that their study “systematically codes the conversations leading 
up to a decision to peremptorily strike or pass a potential juror. In so doing, it maps out the actual 
conversation documented in written transcripts between each targeted juror and the judge, prosecutor, 
and defense counsel trying the case.”); Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the 
Garden: Lawyers Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163 (2005); Anna Offit, Peer Review: 
Navigating Uncertainty in the United States Jury System, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 169 (2016). 
145. See generally ROBIN CONLEY RINER, CONFRONTING THE DEATH PENALTY: HOW LANGUAGE 
INFLUENCES JURORS IN CAPITAL CASES (2016) (Riner’s ethnographic research drew on interviews 
with twenty-one former capital jurors.). 
146. See Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note 144. 
147. This includes data gathered from interviews with attorneys as well as informal discussions 
among lawyers—including those taking place during breaks in trial proceedings or out of court. 
148. ANN SOUTHWORTH & CATHERINE L. FISK, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: ETHICS IN 
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 356–57 (2014) (discussing how plea bargains undermine the transparency 
of criminal procedure and trials); Candace McCoy, Prosecution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 663, 682 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (engaging in a similar discussion). 
149. Participant observation is an ethnographic research method that entails an inductive and 
immersive field study aimed at attaining an understanding of the meaning research subjects impute to 
their decisions, actions, and multitude of social practices by their own accounts. See Signe Howell, 
Ethnography, CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANTHROPOLOGY (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://www.anthroencyclopedia.com/entry/ethnography [https://perma.cc/Y9J5-886V]. 
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Figure 1:  




1. Inconsistent Judicial Assessments of Hardship Excuses 
The first conclusion drawn from the empirical data is that judges do not 
take a uniform approach to exercising cause challenges. Interviews with 
state and federal prosecutors, as well as defense attorneys, all point toward 
this conclusion.151 Some judges were perceived as taking a “flexible,”152 
“reasonable,”153 “respectful,”154 “deferential,”155 “sympathetic,”156 
 
150. This graphic came from the Author’s anonymized research.  
151. See, e.g., Interview with 6V, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“I think in terms of hardship . . . it 
depends on the judge’s agenda . . . I don’t believe there is a rhyme or reason.”); Interview with 6S, 
State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“Depending on which floor of the courthouse, every question is going 
to be different.”); Interview with 6Q, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“With regard to hardships and 
how courts respond, I think it depends on the judge.”); Interview with 5S, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in 
U.S. (2020) (“I think it comes down to individual judges.”). 
152. See, e.g., Interview with 6X, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“Most of the times in most trials, 
courts are pretty flexible if they think they’re going to have enough jurors.”). 
153. See, e.g., Interview with 6Q, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“Painting with a broad brush, 
most judges are reasonable.”). 
154. See, e.g., Interview with 5X, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“It has been only on rare 
occasions I’ve seen a judge force someone to remain in the jury pool who said they didn’t want to be 
there . . . . everyone’s usually pretty respectful.”). 
155. See, e.g., Interview with 6H, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (“The judge whose court 
I’m in now I’ve found to be very deferential.”). 
156. See, e.g., Interview with 6C, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (explaining that judges’ 
approaches to hardship excuses “var[y] so widely [and] depend entirely on the judge . . . generally 
speaking judges are rather sympathetic”). 
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“fair,”157 or even “lenient”158 approach to excusing prospective jurors who 
presented hardship concerns. The exchange below between a judge and 
prospective juror during state court jury selection proceedings illustrates 
how “flexibility” or “sympathy” figures in the process of identifying 
financial hardship. In response to a middle-aged White male construction 
worker’s concern about lost wages, the judge asked: 
 
Judge: Is it an hourly wage? 
 
Prospective Juror: Yes, it is. 
 
Judge: And this would cause a hardship? 
 
Prospective Juror: It might. 
 
Judge: Ok. I don’t want to put anyone in a bind . . . but when you say 
it might . . . . 
 
Prospective Juror: I mean lost wages. 
 
Judge: Are you the only provider in your household? 
 
Prospective Juror: Yes, sir. 
 
Judge: Ok, I’ll excuse you.159 
 
In this context, the prospective juror appeared visibly uncomfortable—
pausing before offering responses and averting eye contact—as though 
self-conscious about the judge’s effort to frame his requested dismissal as 
a legally permissible hardship excuse. In an exchange with a different 
juror, the same judge reframed a prospective juror’s concerns about 
burdens posed by the anticipated trial schedule in a manner that enhanced 
the excuse’s legitimacy. In this case a prospective juror raised her hand 
and explained: 
 
Prospective Juror: My problem is I have a lot of bills to pay—including 
 
157. See, e.g., Interview with 6R, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“Our judges are typically pretty 
fair about those things in my experience.”). 
158. See, e.g., Interview with 5U, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (describing the judges who 
presided over the prosecutor’s last three jury trials as taking a “lenient” approach to excusing 
prospective jurors with hardship concerns). 
159. E-1 Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings, in U.S. (2013–2017). 
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paying my own rent . . . . 
 
Judge: I see. [pause] And are you self-employed? 
 
Prospective Juror: Yes . . . I work for myself. 
 
Judge: So, while you’re a juror, you have no other source of income? 
 
Prospective Juror: No, sir.160 
 
In this exchange, the judge guided the juror toward identifying herself as 
“self-employed” before granting a cause challenge—signaling the 
legitimacy of this excuse for other prospective jurors who were seated in 
open court. 
Several of the prosecutors and defense attorneys I interviewed 
emphasized judges’ willingness to excuse prospective jurors who 
expressly mentioned childcare obligations, or the needs of other 
dependent family members.161 Some lawyers felt this tendency reflected 
judges’ intuitions that jurors who raised childcare concerns were more 
likely to be sincere in their requests for excusal.162 
Still, lawyers agreed that not all judges evinced a willingness to dismiss 
low-income people or prospective jurors with dependents. In fact, some 
felt that judges were more likely to honor hardship excusal requests that 
pointed to an inconvenience, rather than a genuine financial burden. 
Examples included concerns about vacation plans163 and business trips.164 
One federal defender even averred that often socio-economic 
 
160. Id. 
161. See, e.g., Interview with 5O, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (characterizing judges’ 
willingness to excuse jurors with childcare concerns as rendering them more like “exemptions,” since 
most judges are “sympathetic” to this concern); see also Interview with 6W, State Pub. Def., in U.S. 
(2020) (“Judges tended to be more understanding and willing to let people go when [they had] 
concerns about caring for children and especially special needs children or other family members.”); 
Interview with 6N, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (noting that juror excusals due to childcare 
obligations were more prevalent than those due to financial, medical, or other sources of hardship).  
162. See, e.g., Interview with 6M, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (noting that although jurors 
sometimes present “phony” excuses related to taking care of small children they are unlikely to be 
“made up”); cf. Interview with 6J, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (noting that where defense attorney 
described judges’ skepticism about prospective jurors’ childcare excuses due to a perception that 
caretaking help was readily available in the jurisdiction). 
163. See Interview with 6L, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020); Interview with 5G, Assistant Dist. 
Att’y, in U.S. (2020); Interview with 6J, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020). 
164. See Interview with 5Q, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020); Interview with 6J, Assistant Dist. 
Att’y, in U.S. (2020); Interview with 6C, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (noting the perception 
that judges were particularly sympathetic to small business owners who raised hardship excuses). 
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considerations cut the other way, saying that “hardship excuses are 
classist in the sense that vacations are considered a hardship excuse, but 
losing my job is not.”165 In some cases, judges’ skepticism about the actual 
possibility of job loss prompted judges to insist that they would personally 
contact jurors’ employers to verify such claims.166 
What to make of this “harsh”167 or more unforgiving attitude toward 
jurors’ concerns about financial burdens?168 What at first glance seems 
indicative of a bias toward making low-income people serve is in fact 
evidence of the contradictory motives that legal actors must confront 
when building juries. Judges, my interlocutors agreed, wished to be 
benevolent toward people for whom jury service might constitute a 
burden. At the same time, they did not want to risk losing too many jurors 
from the venire—or “busting the panel.”169 In a country where many 
people work paycheck to paycheck, deferring too freely to material 
concerns would mean that “two-thirds of the panel [would] raise their 
hands” with similar excuses.170 For this reason, it was not unusual to see 
judges “really grill jurors” or exercise caution before “letting 
someone go.”171 
Lawyers agreed that judges’ two modes—benevolence and vigilance—
made it difficult to propose and contest cause challenges.172 In one wire 
fraud case, for example, a trial team of federal prosecutors bemoaned their 
 
165. Interview with 6L, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020). 
166. See, e.g., Interview with 5E, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (“I have heard judges say if 
your employer gives you a problem I’ll contact them directly.”); see also Interview with 5O, Assistant 
Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (recalling a judge who asked prospective juror who was concerned about 
getting fired to identify that juror’s employer).  
167. See, e.g., Interview with 6U, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (describing a judge who was 
“notoriously harsh on letting jurors or potential jurors have any exceptions and she would even 
threaten people for contempt if they lied or tried to get out”). 
168. See, e.g., Interview with 6F, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (“[M]ost of the time, the 
financial excuse is an absolute no.”); see also Interview with 5Y, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) 
(describing judges’ responses to jurors’ hardship concerns in “most trials” as “welp, ok, too bad”). 
169. See Interview with 6X, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020); Interview with 6T, State Pub. Def., in 
U.S. (2020); Interview with 6O, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020). 
170. See Interview with 5J, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020). 
171. Interview with 6B, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020); see also 6J, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in 
U.S. (2020) (suggesting that judges became increasingly strict in their hardship excuse criteria as 
more jurors were excused and fewer remained in court for potential empanelment). 
172. A narrow exception to this trend could be seen in cases tried during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
in which judges modified their general procedure to afford counsel time in advance of trial to review 
prospective jurors’ detailed responses to written questionnaires. See, e.g., Interview with 6Y, State 
Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (describing a judge’s decision to send counsel detailed juror questionnaire 
responses one week before the commencement of a criminal prosecution during the                       
COVID-19 pandemic). 
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lack of information about the judge’s approach to managing voir dire.173 
When a prospective juror expressed concern that his employment would 
be compromised if he served, a prosecutor shared that she had “no sense” 
of how the judge presiding over their case would interpret and respond to 
a juror’s preexisting work commitment.174 This prompted a colleague to 
respond that in his experience, judges requested clarity about the actual 
risk of job termination that missing a work trip could pose—and whether 
the judge herself could authenticate the prospective juror’s excuse with 
the employer.175 Some federal prosecutors shared that even in the face of 
judicial inconsistency, they themselves tried to be consistent.176 For 
instance, they often felt obligated to dismiss jurors who explicitly used the 
language of financial hardship.177 
In both state and federal court, the cause challenge phase of jury 
selection revealed significant differences between individual judges. In 
addition to approaching the evaluation of hardship excuses differently, 
judges also managed the process of considering cause challenges 
differently.178 Some judges invited the sustained participation of lawyers, 
while others directed lines of questioning, and follow-up 
questioning, themselves.179 
Highlighting the variability of judicial approaches is critical to 
disabusing the reader of any notion that judges lack discretion and 
function as automatons when it comes to socio-economic exclusion. In 
fact, judges, like other legal actors, make decisions under particular legal 
and normative constraints while trying to balance competing imperatives. 
The desires to be benevolent and vigilant manifest themselves in different 
practices and outcomes. Critically, however, judges often navigated 
difficulties by enlisting lawyers in the process of evaluating claims. 
 
173. Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with FB, DB & FA, in U.S. (2013–2017). 
174. Id. 
175. Id.; see also Interview with 5J, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020). During the interview, a 
state prosecutor commented on judges’ willingness to test a prospective juror’s veracity with respect 
to anticipated work conflicts. Id.   
176. I-44 Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with FB, DB & FA, in U.S. (2013–2017). 
177. Id. 
178. See, e.g., Gregory E. Mize & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Building a Better Voir Dire Process, 47 
JUDGES’ J. 4, 8 (2008) (presenting the results of a four-year long fifty-state survey in 2007 revealing 
that in state court, 25.9% of jury selection proceedings were exclusively managed by judges, and 
19.4% involved the equal participation of judges and lawyers; in federal court, jury selection 
proceedings were exclusively managed by judges in 69.6% of trials, and by judges and lawyers 
equally in 13.6% of trials). 
179. Id. 
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2. Judicial Authorization of Excusal by Attorney Consent 
Cause challenges lie within the sole discretion of the court. Still, 
participant observation and interviews confirmed that judges routinely 
deferred to counsel on such questions, at which point attorneys could 
agree to excuse prospective jurors without placing reasons for such 
decisions on the record.180 “The common practice,” one federal defender 
explained, was for a judge to say “attorneys, see who you agree on and 
when you’re done, approach the bench.”181 While some lawyers took this 
practice for granted,182 others viewed it as “passing the buck”—or 
inappropriately evading responsibility.183 
In practice, this deference of judicial power meant that prosecutors and 
defense attorneys regularly found themselves in the position of assessing 
prospective jurors’ hardship excuses themselves. This required that 
lawyers, not judges, determine whether jurors’ self-reported professional 
or family commitments made jury service financially burdensome. 
Reaching a conclusion was made difficult by the fact that across 
jurisdictions, legal thresholds for personal hardship are ill-defined and 
inconsistently deployed. Making matters only more complex, jurors did 
not always identify themselves as requiring excusal on one of the 
specified grounds, as doing so might be humiliating.184 Prosecutors and 
defense attorneys were therefore often left to identify, evaluate, or contest 
indices of suitability based on scant or ambiguous information. 
In the course of observing jury selection strategy meetings, for 
example, I noted that federal prosecutors often gave interpretations of 
juror hardship that went beyond the actual excuses provided in court. In 
these cases, prosecutors tried to imagine what jurors actually meant by 
“enormous financial hardship” and concluded that many people with such 
excuses likely felt that they could not “complain” to the judge.185 
And this was likely true. Even in cases in which the venire was told 
 
180. See, e.g., Interview with 5K, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (“Judges will put the 
decision about cause challenges on attorneys.”); see also Interview with 6S, State Pub. Def., in 
U.S. (2020).  
181. See Interview with 6Q, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020). 
182. Interview with 5L, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (“It’s something we do deal with in 
every single one of our jury selections. For the most part, judges will leave it up to the lawyers.”). 
183. See Interview with 6C, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020).  
184. See Offit, supra note 144, at 190; see also Interview with BJ, Assistant U.S. Att’ys, in 
U.S. (2013). 
185. I-43 Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with AY & BQ, in U.S. (2013–2017). During 
the proceedings, jurors stated they “could not afford to lose income for that long,” and stated, after 
having been empaneled, that their employers would not compensate them for the duration of their 
jury service. Id. 
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that a trial would last for months, prospective jurors rarely shared explicit 
concern about missing work. If federal prosecutors had the benefit of 
using written questionnaires, they typically speculated about a juror’s 
ability to serve based on stated occupations. Among the prospective jurors 
who emerged as causes for concern, for example, was a T.J. Maxx retail 
associate, an auto repairman, a department manager at Walmart, a Sheet 
Metal Journeyman, a food service worker, a warehouse shipping clerk, a 
crossing guard, Uber drivers, substitute or assistant teachers, a produce 
clerk, a substation mechanic, and a delivery driver—among others.186 
They also expressed concern about the impact of jury service on those 
who were unemployed but actively searching for new positions.187 This 
included a juror who had scheduled an interview that conflicted with the 
jury selection proceedings and explained that she was desperate for the 
job.188 Significantly, this meant that the jurors who prosecutors and 
defense attorneys believed would make appealing jurors were often those 
who they believed could afford to serve.189 
Their motives were mixed. Some prosecutors expressed a desire to 
benevolently spare those who might otherwise suffer undue economic 
hardship.190 At the same time, it was commonly understood that financial 
hardship could prove to be an impediment to the legal process, as the 
discovery of a juror’s scheduling conflicts or financial precarity might 
disrupt the trial later on.191 
Removing jurors, however, was not always straightforward. 
 
186. Id. 
187. I-32 Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with AI & AV, in U.S. (2013–2017); I-43 
Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with AY & BQ, in U.S. (2013–2017); Participation in 
Jury Selection Proceedings with FB, DB & FA, in U.S. (2013–2017); Participation in Jury Selection 
Proceedings with BT & AA, in U.S. (2013–2017) (describing an instance in which a prosecutor 
commented that he could not understand how a prospective juror who was “between jobs” could 
be empaneled). 
188. I-32 Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with AI & AV, in U.S. (2013–2017). 
189. See, e.g., Interview with AZ, Assistant U.S. Att’y, in U.S. (2013) (describing jurors that 
prosecutors ultimately empaneled as “usually kind of middleclass people who find their jobs boring 
or don’t mind being away from their office for a couple of weeks and find it like a vacation”); 
Interview with AL, Assistant U.S. Att’y, in U.S. (2013) (characterizing the district’s typical jury pool 
as “middle class—not blue collar”); Interview with BC, Assistant U.S. Att’y, in U.S. (2013) 
(commenting that desired jurors have “steady employment” and are “solidly middle class”); Interview 
with BZ, Assistant U.S. Att’y, in U.S. (2013) (noting that the jurors he is “looking for” are 
“middle class”). 
190. Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with BT & AA, in U.S. (2013–2017). During this 
interview, a prosecutor commented that a Williams Sonoma employee was likely to be discouraged 
from serving as a juror because she probably worked on commission; a different prosecutor noted that 
although a summer camp director had not raised a hardship excuse, the trial’s summer schedule would 
undoubtedly pose a problem. Id. 
191. Id. 
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Prosecutors sought to make cases for excusal more persuasive by 
highlighting evidence of a juror’s unsuitability due to financial or 
logistical barriers that might have been addressed through material 
support. For instance, I witnessed prospective jurors without access to cars 
dismissed for cause at prosecutors’ recommendations.192 Depending on 
prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ impressions of a prospective juror, 
sources of hardship could be strategically emphasized or downplayed.193 
If multiple prospective jurors described travel conflicts during voir dire in 
the same trial, for example, prosecutors might respond differently 
depending on their impressions jurors’ answers to other questions.194 
Overall, the difficulty faced by judges in navigating hardship excuses 
fostered a situation in which lawyers were regularly asked to weigh in on 
strike decisions. In a sense, this augmented lawyers’ ability to make 
peremptory challenges. One public defender praised this practice, 
declaring that it allowed attorneys to excuse jurors for cause who they 
otherwise found problematic “without wasting our peremptories.”195 The 
hardship excusal process thus created an opening, understated in extant 
scholarly literature, for socio-economic inequity to take root in the 
jury system. 
3. Practical and Strategic Barriers to Attorney Empanelment of 
Jurors Facing Financial Hardship 
Though some jurors came forward with hardship excuses related to 
work constraints, childcare obligations, and concerns about paying bills 
due to lost income, many jurors remained silent. Eliciting such personal 
information from jurors, I saw as a participant observer, often necessitated 
patient, empathetic, and persistent work—often at sidebar. This was also 
true of prospective jurors who responded to voir dire questions in writing. 
Even when accounts of hardships were explicitly requested through 
written questionnaires, prospective jurors could be reluctant to 
characterize their personal circumstances as “extraordinary,” perhaps 
recognizing the commonality of their experience.196 
 
192. Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with FB, DB & FA, in U.S. (2013–2017); I-43 
Participation in Jury Selection Proceedings with AY & BQ, in U.S. (2013–2017). 
193. I-43 Participation in jury selection proceedings with AY & BQ, in U.S. (2013–2017). 
194. Id.  
195. Interview with 6T, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (describing a judge who told counsel they 
could dismiss jurors they agreed upon and not “worry about using your [peremptory] challenges for 
this purpose”). 
196. See Interview with 6T, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (noting that jurors’ presentations of 
hardship excuses can be a source of “embarrassment” and that benevolent judges could spare them 
such embarrassment by excusing them).  
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To the extent that prospective jurors did express concern about their 
empanelment in a case, prosecutors and defense attorneys were often 
unified in the belief that citizens who did not want to serve as jurors should 
not be forced to do so.197 Prosecutors and defense attorneys were 
particularly concerned that those with financial concerns might be 
preoccupied and therefore inattentive during trial.198 And prosecutors 
were particularly worried that a juror whose hardship excuse was denied 
might harbor resentment toward the government for charging and 
prosecuting a case.199 Likewise, there were defense attorneys who worried 
that a juror who raised a hardship excuse after hearing others present 
similar concerns might be a “follower looking to get out the door,” 
unlikely to stand up to fellow jurors during contentious deliberations in a 
criminal case.200 In some cases, prosecutors and defense attorneys felt so 
strongly that jurors should be excused for cause that they were willing to 
use peremptory challenges to remove them.201 
Notwithstanding lawyers’ interest in excusing prospective jurors facing 
financial hardship, prosecutors and defense attorneys shared concern that 
the representativeness of empaneled juries would suffer. One federal 
defender expressed concern that cause challenges likely “skewed” the jury 
pool in longer trials, since poorly compensated jurors would be unlikely 
to participate.202 Likening contemporary jury selection practice to voter 
suppression, another federal defender interpreted the disparate presence 
of White male prospective jurors as evidence that most poor and working-
class people, including undocumented workers who were not summoned 
for jury duty to begin with, were systematically cut from the process.203 
Some prosecutors shared this concern, noting that citizens excused 
 
197. See, e.g., Interviews with AK, Assistant U.S. Att’y, in U.S. (2013) (“[I]f a person says they 
don’t want to serve, I don’t want them to.”); Interview with AM, Assistant U.S. Att’y, in U.S. (2015) 
(“I don’t like jurors that show any indication during voir dire that they do not want to be there.”); see 
also Interview with 6O, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“From a personal perspective, I’ve never seen 
a person who’s wanted to get off a jury who I’ve wanted to keep. I don’t want someone who doesn’t 
want to be there.”). 
198. See, e.g., Interview with 5J, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (noting that a juror distracted 
“based on a home life situation is not going to be able to pay attention to the evidence that’s 
presented”); see also Interview with 6M, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“If they have those types of 
economic problems, they’re not going to be focusing on the trial.”). 
199. See Interview with 6J, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020).  
200. See Interview with 6Q, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020).  
201. See Interviews with 6T & 6S, State Pub. Defs., in U.S. (2020); Interviews with 5E & 5U, 
Assistant Dist. Att’ys, in U.S. (2020).  
202. Interview with 6N, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020). 
203. See Interview with 6Q, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020). See generally Amy R. Motomura, Note, 
The American Jury: Can Noncitizens Still Be Excluded?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1503 (2012). 
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from venires in their jurisdictions were often Hispanic,204 Black,205 or 
likely to live in neighborhoods that faced disparate or discriminatory 
policing by law enforcement.206 Beyond the introduction of racial 
disparities, prosecutors noted the broader problem of losing jurors with 
different “life situations” including those who faced adversity.207 
Concern about jury representativeness led some defense attorneys to 
argue adamantly that indigent jurors, who shared financial hardship in 
common with their clients, should never be excused by consent. “I would 
not let them off the hook,” one public defender explained, “and I think 
most defense attorneys would not, because we have to do our job and that 
supersedes everything else.”208 The attorney went on to explain that 
choosing to “agree to an exemption” could mean forfeiting an error that 
could otherwise be preserved for appeal.209 
Many defense attorneys, however, felt they had no choice but to accede 
to cause challenges about which they had strong reservations. “The ritual 
I see,” one federal defender explained, 
is when someone says there’s a hardship and the judge finds it 
persuasive they’ll say, “does anyone have an objection to that?” 
Once the judge signals an intent to grant a hardship excuse, I 
haven’t ever seen, or rarely have seen, an attorney from either side 
object to that.210 
The issue, by this and other defense attorneys’ accounts, was that judges’ 
interpretations of cause challenge decisions often pressured the parties to 
agree to such challenges. Defense attorneys were particularly anxious 
about the possibility that resisting a cause challenge would lead jurors to 
turn against them.211 Prosecutors shared this sentiment, and expressed 
discomfort when judges put them in the position of having to dispute the 
legitimacy of jurors’ financial concerns in their presence.212 
What the foregoing shows is that for different reasons, the desires and 
 
204. See Interview with 5G, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020).  
205. See Interview with 5J, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020). 
206. Id. (noting that lawyers “don’t want to strike everyone who makes under $30,000 per year” 
since those with low wages are likely “less trusting of the criminal justice system,” raising particular 
concern on the part of defense counsel). 
207. Interview with 5S, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020). 
208. See Interview with 6V, State Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020).  
209. Id.  
210. See Interview with 6L, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (emphasis in original). 
211. See, e.g., Interview with 6P, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (“I don’t want [the juror] to know 
that I’m forcing her to come here and not provide for [her] family.” (emphasis in original)). 
212. See, e.g., Interview with 5N, Assistant Dist. Att’y, in U.S. (2020) (noting judges will generally 
“put it to attorneys, which we hate . . . we’re not going to make an argument that will poison us out 
of that juror”). 
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objectives of prosecutors and defense attorneys could align to make low-
income or financially strained prospective jurors undesirable—even when 
they bemoaned the homogeneity of the juries that resulted. Afforded 
greater discretion by judges who were caught between the imperatives to 
be benevolent and to be vigilant, these legal actors exercised power over 
the production of juries that went beyond their allotted peremptory 
challenges. But as with the judges, lawyers’ motives for striking indigent 
jurors should not be viewed as inherently or deliberately nefarious. Jurors 
who were poor were often viewed as potential impediments to an efficient 
trial, disadvantageous to a case or client, or unduly burdened by a legal 
system that could not fairly compensate them for their time. In many 
cases, giving prospective jurors what they wanted—a way out of poorly 
compensated service—allowed judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys 
to believe they were best serving everyone’s interests. 
C. Analysis 
Beyond the problem of juror attrition during the “summoning” and 
“summons response” phases of jury selection based on financial 
hardship,213 empirical research shows that jurors are most likely to face 
dismissal during voir dire as a result of economic hardship, including the 
risk of lost income, and the need to care for a child or another 
dependent.214 These studies demonstrate that a juror’s financial hardship 
plays a significant role in that person’s willingness, if not ability, to report 
to court and ultimately serve on a jury. As a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic, anecdotal evidence suggests that citizens of color raise a 
disparate number of financial hardship concerns,215 though this has not 
necessarily led to the disproportionately White and male juries that some 
 
213. As Professors Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond, and Marc A. Musick outline in their 
study of lifetime jury participation in Texas, jurors must be summoned for jury service, recognize and 
respond to this summons, and complete a period of in-court questioning in order to be assigned to sit 
as jurors in particular cases. See Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Marc A. Musick, Selected 
to Serve: An Analysis of Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 33, 35 (2012). 
214. See HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE JURY: 
RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 64 (1993) (noting, in the context of a 
California-based research study, that factors that are most likely to lead to prospective jurors’ excusal 
include: “(1) economic hardship; (2) lack of child care; (3) age; (4) the distance traveled and 
transportation; and (5) illness”); ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE TO JURY 
SUMMONSES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 117–20 (1998); JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN, G. 
THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, BRIAN LYNCH & STEVEN D. PENROD, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., THE 
RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR FEES AND TERMS OF SERVICE TO JURY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 40 (1991), 
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/juries/id/105  [https://perma.cc/WY9P-
FM9P].  
215. See Tillotson Law Survey, supra note 122. 
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researchers predicted.216 As the previous sections have shown, the 
question of how prospective jurors facing economic or caretaking burdens 
lose representation on juries requires sustained qualitative study. 
What the findings above show is that economic hardship remains an 
elusive and unelaborated basis for a juror’s dismissal. This is because 
jurors’ concerns about losing income, jeopardizing their jobs, and caring 
for young, elderly, or disabled family members, prompt the highly 
subjective and variable scrutiny of judges. In addition to judges’ unilateral 
dismissals of prospective jurors for reasons of hardship, judges often defer 
hardship decisions to attorneys who either agree to dismiss a prospective 
juror or exercise a peremptory challenge. In such cases, lawyers find 
themselves in the position of assessing peoples’ abilities to maintain 
livelihoods despite jury participation, while weighing such decisions 
against the possibility that others will invoke similar rationales such that 
an inadequate number of venirepersons would be available to fill the box. 
One consequence of the largely unregulated and unreviewable nature 
of cause challenges is the difficulty of investigating how they contribute 
to the race or sex disparities among empaneled jurors. Another is a more 
fundamental distortion of the purpose of such challenges. Rather than 
identify sources of bias or ineligibility, cause challenges often lead to the 
dismissal of capable jurors who identify themselves as precariously 
employed, poor, or otherwise responsible for uncompensated domestic 
labor, including childcare. In the absence of reform efforts aimed at 
providing material support to citizens for the duration of jury service, 
juries will fail to meaningfully represent the socio-economically stratified 
communities from which they are drawn. At a time of growing social 
inequality217 and attention to systemic racism in the criminal justice 
system,218 the stakes of neglecting sources of jury discrimination are high, 
and point to the need for reforms described in the Part that follows. 
 
216. See Interview with 6O, Fed. Pub. Def., in U.S. (2020) (describing a jury trial that took place 
during the pandemic in which the empaneled jury reflected greater racial diversity than was typical 
in his experience, in the district).  
217. See generally James E. Wright II & Cullen C. Merritt, Social Equity and COVID-19: The Case 
of African Americans, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 820 (2020) (discussing the pandemic’s disparate impact 
on American citizens of color). 
218. See generally NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN 
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 34–36 (2016) (describing the racialized landscape of the 
criminal legal system based on the observation of court proceedings). See also John Eligon & Audra 
D. S. Burch, After a Summer of Racial Reckoning, Race Is on the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/us/racial-justice-elections.html 
[https://perma.cc/5VVE-W3BA]. 
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IV. DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 
The history, law, and practice of jury selection in the United States 
suggest that socio-economic status plays a considerable role in 
determining who will ultimately serve on juries. This reality has led 
researchers, and others involved in jury reform initiatives, to try to remove 
practical and material obstacles to jury participation. In Thiel v. Southern 
Pacific Co.,219 for instance, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
the systematic excusal of day laborers and low-income workers.220 Still, it 
afforded judges the discretion to excuse such individuals on a case-by-
case basis. Tellingly, a considerable portion of the Thiel Court’s opinion 
explained how the wholesale exclusion of day laborers would create an 
imbalanced jury system, since citizens of every class and occupation were 
fit to serve, and jury qualification was an individual, rather than a group, 
matter.221 The clerk who had dismissed prospective jurors who were day 
laborers nonetheless framed the decision as one of benevolence; he sought 
to excuse a group of jurors who, for legitimate reasons of hardship, needed 
their wages to live, and could not afford to take time off to serve on a 
jury.222 Herein lies the problem that the American jury system has yet to 
resolve: Representative juries must be created, and supported, through a 
concerted effort. And meaningful reform of the jury system’s composition 
requires more than a normative commitment to inclusion. If jurors are not 
adequately compensated and otherwise supported for the duration of their 
service, their dismissal from the venire for reasons of financial hardship 
will virtually assure their continued exclusion. 
A. How Jurors Are—Or Are Not—Compensated 
Jurisdictions have taken a variety of approaches to implementing jury 
compensation schemes. Some states pay jurors a nominal sum for each 
 
219. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
220. Id. at 224 (“It is clear that a federal judge would be justified in excusing a daily wage earner 
for whom jury service would entail an undue financial hardship.”). 
221. Id. at 220 (“Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be 
found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. 
That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions 
and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.”). 
222. Id. at 222 (“If I see in the directory the name of John Jones and it says he is a longshoreman, 
I do not put his name in, because I have found by experience that that man will not serve as a juror, 
and I will not get people who will qualify. The minute that a juror is called into court on a venire and 
says he is working for $10 a day and cannot afford to work for four, the Judge has never made one of 
those men serve, and so in order to avoid putting names of people in who I know won’t become jurors 
in the court, won’t qualify as jurors in this court, I do leave them out . . . . Where I thought the 
designation indicated that they were day laborers, I mean they were people who were compensated 
solely when they were working by the day, I leave them out.”). 
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full day of service.223 Other states have laws that strongly encourage, if 
not require, employers to compensate employees during the days they 
report for jury service.224 And still other states offer types of assistance 
that can help with caretaking commitments.225 
The range of juror pay also varies widely from one jurisdiction to the 
next. Jurors in federal court receive fifty dollars per day of service, and 
sixty dollars per day after serving for ten days.226 Prospective and 
empaneled jurors who are federal employees, however, are paid their 
regular salaries.227 Taking into account that the average federal salary for 
civilians, according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
is $94,463, an average federal juror working for the federal government 
could be looking at payment of more than $300 per day.228 While this is 
just one example of juror pay inequality depending on one’s occupation, 
and there is certainly dramatic variation in federal workers’ income,229 it 
illustrates the different economic incentives that can motivate otherwise 
eligible jurors and introduce class disparities to juries. 
In Frazier v. United States,230 the defendant, Frazier, argued that 
 
223. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 3, at 11 (offering an overview of different states’ approaches to 
compensating jurors beyond universal “reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses as well as token 
monetary recognition” of jury service’s value). 
224. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-71-126 (West 2021) (“All regularly employed trial or 
grand jurors shall be paid regular wages, but not to exceed fifty dollars per day unless by mutual 
agreement between the employee and employer, by their employers for the first three days of juror 
service or any part thereof. Regular employment shall include part-time, temporary, and casual 
employment if the employment hours may be determined by a schedule, custom, or practice 
established during the three-month period preceding the juror’s term of service.”); ALA. CODE § 12-
16-8(c) (2021) (“Notwithstanding the excused absence provided in subsection (a), any full-time 
employee shall be entitled to his or her usual compensation received from such employment.”). 
225. CAL. CT. R. 10.24 (“Each court should endeavor to provide a children’s waiting room located 
in the courthouse for the use of minors under the age of 16 who are present on court premises as 
participants or who accompany persons who are participants in court proceedings. 
The waiting room should be supervised and open during normal court hours. If a court does not have 
sufficient space in the courthouse for a children’s waiting room, the court should create the necessary 
space when court facilities are reorganized or remodeled or when new facilities are constructed.”). 
226. See, e.g., Juror Pay, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/juror-
pay [https://perma.cc/QG7Q-7APT]. 
227. Id. 
228. National Income and Product Accounts: Table 6.6D, U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&1921=survey 
[https://perma.cc/523A-GF3X]. 
229. As an illustration of this range, a Human Resources Manager for the Veterans Benefits 
Administration can earn $712,205 per year and a federally employed laundry worker can earn $19,305 
per year. Compare Top 100 Highest-Paid Government Employees of 2018, FEDERALPAY.ORG, 
https://www.federalpay.org/employees/top-100 [https://perma.cc/7CX9-A8DM], with Lowest Paid 
100  Federal  Occupations  in  2018,  FEDERALPAY.ORG,  https://www.federalpay.org/employees/ 
occupations/lowest-100/2018 [https://perma.cc/V5KM-YEU8]. 
230. 335 U.S. 497 (1948). 
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because of the federal worker wage replacement policy which was in place 
at the time, his jury was entirely composed of federal employees who, in 
his view, were biased against him.231 Though Frazier lost, Justice 
Jackson’s dissenting opinion noted the predicament that such 
compensation schemes caused; federal workers protected against any 
financial loss could fill jury panels, while non-federal workers could 
decline service to avoid lost income.232 Among the issues highlighted in 
the dissent, Justice Jackson noted the discussion of the inadequacy of juror 
pay that ultimately animated the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 
discussed earlier.233 Indeed, one of the concerns that informed the 
legislation was the possibility that unequal pay among citizens would 
result in juries with disproportionate numbers of government workers.234 
1. Hardship Funds 
The gap between jurors’ financial needs and their compensation during 
jury service will only widen as pay rates remain stagnant in state and 
federal court. The American Legislative Exchange Council’s (ALEC) 
introduction of the Jury Patriotism Act has been the most sweeping reform 
initiative aimed at supporting eligible jurors who would otherwise be 
unable to participate for financial reasons.235 Arizona was the first state to 
enact this law in 2003.236 Perhaps the biggest change the act brought about 
was the Lengthy Trial Fund (LTF), which provides supplemental pay for 
jurors who spend more than five days on a jury.237 Under this scheme, a 
juror can receive between $40 and $300 per day, depending upon the 
 
231. Id. at 498–502. The case involved a jury panel with both government and non-government 
employees, and the defendant was the one to strike the non-government employees, and then felt his 
jury was biased. Id. The Court held that government employees could in fact serve as jurors due to 
the lack of inherent bias in their positions. Id. at 513. The Court held further that the defendant was 
neither deprived of an impartial jury nor able to show actual bias. Id.  
232. Id. at 516–17 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The non-government juror receives $4 per day, which 
under present conditions is inadequate to be compensatory to nearly every gainfully employed juror. 
But the government employee is not paid specially; instead, he is given leave from his government 
work with full pay while serving on the jury. The latter class are thus induced to jury service by 
protection against any financial loss, while the former are subjected to considerable disadvantage.”).  
233. See supra section I.B. 
234. Judicial Machinery Hearings, supra note 52, at 180–93 (statement of Mr. Monroe H. 
Freedman, Professor, George Washington University Law School, on the subject of unequal juror pay 
leading to potentially biased juries). 
235. Cary Silverman, ALEC’s Jury Patriotism Act: Reducing Hardship for Thousands of Jurors 
and Ensuring Representative Juries on Complex Cases, INSIDE ALEC, March 2012, at 5, 5–6. The 
proposal was first finalized in 2003. 
236. Id. at 6. 
237. Id.  
Offit (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2021  10:34 AM 
652 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:613 
 
amount of lost income.238 Jurors who are unemployed or cannot otherwise 
prove that income is lost receive $40 per day after their sixth day of jury 
service rather than a rate of pay that might better align with their actual 
needs.239 And all jurors in Arizona, regardless of employment status, 
receive $12 per day for the first five days of service.240 Oklahoma, another 
state that adopted an LTF, pays jurors $20 per day, which increases to $50 
between the fourth and tenth day and up to $200 from the eleventh 
day onward.241 
Though the funding schemes that states like Arizona and Oklahoma 
adopted are progressive in the financial support they offer to jurors, they 
nonetheless limit their beneficiaries in significant ways. First, as their title 
reflects, LTFs are limited to jurors who participate in the minority242 of 
state and federal trials that exceed a few days.243 Second, these funds are 
limited to jurors who are employed and can demonstrate financial loss. As 
a result, such funds fail to capture the significant, and growing, number of 
Americans who face unemployment and underemployment, as well as 
burdens associated with caretaking obligations or the onerous process of 
seeking work. The recipients of the funds’ most generous payouts are thus 
those who already enjoy stable—if not salaried—jobs that provide a 
living wage. 
2. Juror Compensation Requirements for Employers 
Though some states require employers to compensate jurors for time 
they devote to jury service, the majority of states do not.244 And even states 
with such a requirement do not necessarily call for jurors to be 
 
238. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-222(d) (2021) (“The amount a juror receives from the fund is 
limited to the difference between the jury fee prescribed in § 21-221 and the actual amount of earnings 
a juror earns, not less than forty dollars, up to the maximum level payable under subsection C of this 
section, minus any amount the juror actually received from the juror’s employer during the same 
time period.”). 
239. Id. § 21-222(e) (“Jurors who are unemployed and are not eligible for payment pursuant to 
subsections C and D of this section are eligible to be paid forty dollars per day . . . .”). 
240. Jury Service–What to Expect, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.azcourts.gov/juryduty/Jury-
Service-What-to-Expect [https://perma.cc/GS5A-DXFW]. 
241. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 86 (West 2021). 
242. See DALE ANNE SIPES, MARY ELSNER ORAM, MARLENE A. THORNTON, DANIEL J. VALLUZZI 
& RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS 9 (1988); 
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., 
https://www.mad.uscourts.gov/jurors/pdf/jmsquessp.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YUT-BXQS] (noting 
that the “average jury trial in the Federal Court spans between two to four days”). 
243. Arizona Lengthy Trial Fund–Rules for Eligibility, JUD. BRANCH OF ARIZ.: MARICOPA CNTY., 
https://superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/Jury/Arizona-Lengthy-Trial-Fund [https://perma.cc/E9RC-
REXV]. 
244. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 3, at 11.  
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compensated at their regular rate. Colorado, for example, requires 
employers to pay employees $50 for their first day of service.245 Of the 
remaining six states that require employer compensation, Alabama offers 
the most expansive protections: It requires employers to pay employees 
their regular wage while they serve on a jury and prohibits employers from 
requiring employees to take sick leave or other paid time off to do so.246 
More states follow Colorado’s employer requirement than Alabama’s. 
Connecticut, for example, requires juror payment of $50 per day.247 Other 
statutes reduce wage protection by permitting employers to only pay what 
the state might have paid if the juror was self-employed.248 To put the 
numbers in perspective, aside from New Mexico, where jurors are paid a 
minimum wage for jury work,249 $50 per day is the most that a state-court 
juror can hope to earn through mandatory compensation schemes, with 
many states offering a sum closer to $15 per day.250 
In addition to state juror compensation programs, employers may offer 
separate jury selection compensation to employees by private agreement. 
 
245. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-71-126 (West 2021) (“All regularly employed trial or grand 
jurors shall be paid regular wages, but not to exceed fifty dollars per day unless by mutual agreement 
between the employee and employer, by their employers for the first three days of juror service or 
any part thereof. Regular employment shall include part-time, temporary, and casual employment if 
the employment hours may be determined by a schedule, custom, or practice established during the 
three-month period preceding the juror’s term of service.”). 
246. ALA. CODE § 12-16-8(b)–(d) (2021) (“An employee may not be required or requested to use 
annual, vacation, unpaid leave, or sick leave for time spent responding to a summons for jury duty, 
time spent participating in the jury selection process, or for time spent actually serving on a jury. 
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an employer to provide annual, vacation, or 
sick leave to employees who otherwise are not entitled to the benefits under policies of the 
employer. . . . Notwithstanding the excused absence provided in subsection (a), any full-time 
employee shall be entitled to his or her usual compensation received from such employment. . . . It 
shall be the duty of all persons paying jurors their fee or compensation for services to issue to each 
juror a statement showing the daily fee or compensation and the total fee or compensation received 
by the juror.”). 
247. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-247 (2020) (“A reimbursement award under this subsection for each 
day of service shall not be less than twenty dollars or more than fifty dollars.”). 
248. TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-4-106 (2021) (allowing employers to reduce what the court 
would pay). 
249. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-15 (2021) (“Persons summoned for jury service and jurors shall be 
reimbursed for travel in excess of forty miles round trip from their place of actual residence to the 
courthouse when their attendance is ordered at the rate allowed public officers and employees per 
mile of necessary travel. Persons summoned for jury service and jurors shall be compensated for their 
time in attendance and service at the highest prevailing state minimum wage rate.”). 
250. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 215 (West 2021) (“(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), on and 
after July 1, 2000, the fee for jurors in the superior court, in civil and criminal cases, is fifteen dollars 
($15) a day for each day’s attendance as a juror after the first day. (b) A juror who is employed by a 
federal, state, or local government entity, or by any other public entity as defined in Section 481.200, 
and who receives regular compensation and benefits while performing jury service, may not be paid 
the fee described in subdivision (a).”). 
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In practice, however, employer policies that compensate workers during 
jury service are unlikely to enhance the socio-economic diversity of juries. 
The types of employers that utilize them are likely to pay employees at a 
rate such that an uncompensated week would not prove 
financially devastating.251 
In 2017, the year for which the most recent data is available, the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employee Benefits Survey reported that 57% 
of workers received paid juror leave.252 However, such protection from 
employers is not evenly distributed. White collar sectors including 
management and finance provide paid juror leave to 79% of workers, as 
compared to 33% of service sector employees.253 Within all sectors, those 
with the highest 10% of wages comprised 83% of those who received pay 
during jury service.254 Among those in the bottom 10% of all wage-earners 
across industries, in contrast, only 24% received compensation during 
jury service as a job benefit.255 This suggests that employees in better 
compensated professions not only receive the most generous pay for juror 
leave, but are also less likely to view jury participation as posing a 
financial hardship as compared with workers in other sectors. 
Interestingly, finance and insurance employers are the most likely to 
offer paid jury leave to their employees, with 92% of workers in that 
industry benefiting from such coverage.256 Only 24% of those employed 
in the leisure and hospitality industry, in contrast, were compensated 
during jury service.257 The odds of receiving wages during jury service 
also increase if one works for a company with fewer than fifty 
employees.258 The overwhelming trend in this data is that the most 
financially vulnerable members of the American workforce are also the 
least likely to receive any type of private compensation for fulfilling their 
obligation to participate in the jury system. In its current form, employer-
supported juror pay is thus not an effective solution to the problem of 
socio-economic jury exclusion. 
 





255. Id.  
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id.  
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B. Proposals Toward a Socio-Economically Representative Jury 
System 
1. The Expansion of Juror Compensation Schemes 
Compared to state initiatives to compensate citizens for the duration of 
their jury service, federal juror compensation schemes more closely 
approximate the federal minimum wage (as of 2021) of $7.25 per hour.259 
In 2019, federal jurors received $50 each day for jury service lasting under 
one week, followed by $60 for each day of a trial that exceeded ten 
days.260 Compensation for empanelment on state juries varied more 
dramatically. According to data maintained by the National Center for 
State Courts (NCSC), some jurisdictions refrained from compensating 
jurors for their first day of service,261 while others denied such pay for the 
first several days of service.262 Still other states offered token payment as 
jurors began their service.263 Compensation for professional judges, by 
contrast, has consistently increased to reflect cost-of-living 
adjustments.264 If one were to take seriously the commensurate judicial 
responsibility that jurors assume in judging the facts of cases, even the 
most modestly compensated judges of general jurisdiction receive over 
$60 per hour.265 
Compensating prospective and empaneled jurors at a minimum wage 
rate would represent a step in the right direction. Currently, New Mexico 
is the only state to pay jurors minimum wage in addition to travel expenses 
for commutes that exceed forty miles from home to courthouse.266 In New 
 
259. Alison Doyle, 2021 Federal and State Minimum Wage Rates, THE BALANCE CAREERS (Mar. 
11, 2021), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/2018-19-federal-state-minimum-wage-rates-2061043 
[https://perma.cc/57RV-R7TT]. 
260. Juror Pay, supra note 223. 
261. This includes Arizona, California, Washington, D.C., and Delaware. Jury Management, 
NAT’L CTR.  FOR  STATE  CTS.,  https://www.ncsc.org/services-and-experts/areas-of-expertise/jury-
management [https://perma.cc/62QU-AYZJ]. 
262. This includes Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, and Nevada. Id. 
263. This includes Lake County, Illinois, which compensates jurors $5 for the first two days of 
service, and New Jersey, which offers $5 compensation for each of the first three days of service. 
Jurors in Pennsylvania receive $9 of compensation for the first three days of service. Id.  
264. Judicial Compensation, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
compensation [https://perma.cc/G97L-8BWM]. 
265. This estimate is based on National Center for State Courts 2019 data indicating judges of 
general jurisdiction in Kansas receive an annual salary of $125,499, the lowest of their judicial peers, 
and assumes approximately 40-hours of work per week including paid vacation.  
266. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-15 (2021) (“Persons summoned for jury service and jurors shall be 
reimbursed for travel in excess of forty miles round trip from their place of actual residence to the 
courthouse when their attendance is ordered at the rate allowed public officers and employees per 
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Mexico, this amounts to $9 per hour, or $72 per day.267 There are currently 
sixteen states that compensate jurors at federal minimum wage levels, 
$7.25 per hour, totaling $58 per eight hour work day.268 In Washington, 
D.C., which has the nation’s highest minimum wage, at $15 per hour, juror 
compensation would be $120 per day—rather than the $50 per day that 
federal jurors are currently paid.269 This reform would address the needs 
of prospective jurors, including those surveyed in D.C., who cite their 
inability to forego wages and economic hardship as primarily responsible 
for their inability to report for service.270 
In April 2020, the Washington State Supreme Court decided that its 
jurors did not qualify for minimum wage compensation, explaining that 
their duties lay outside the scope of those of an “employee,” despite the 
fact that for the duration of a trial jurors effectively report to court each 
day to “work.”271 The current default for Washington State jurors is a $10 
per day wage—eleven times less than what they would receive if the 
state’s $13.69 per hour minimum wage was honored during jury 
service.272 Though minimum wage, in all but one state, would not cover a 
juror’s cost of living for even a single person household, it would increase 
current rates of pay significantly in some states, and represent an overall 
improvement over current law.273 And if every state was to adjust 
minimum wage to a level that would support single person households, 
 
mile of necessary travel. Persons summoned for jury service and jurors shall be compensated for their 
time in attendance and service at the highest prevailing state minimum wage rate.”). 
267. Consolidated Minimum Wage Table, WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 1, 2021), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/mw-consolidated [https://perma.cc/CP68-XCAN]. 
268. Id.  
269. Office of Wage-Hour Compliance, DC.GOV: DEP’T OF EMP. SERVS., 
https://does.dc.gov/service/office-wage-hour-compliance-0 [https://perma.cc/F7PZ-TQKF]. 
270. See, e.g., Richard Seltzer, The Vanishing Juror: Why Are There Not Enough Available 
Jurors?, 20 JUST. SYS. J., 203, 214 (1999) (observing in a juror exit survey that 10% of jurors said 
they could not afford to lose pay and 14% cited economic hardship as grounds for failing to participate 
as jurors). 
271. Rocha v. King Cnty., 195 Wash. 2d 412, 424, 460 P.3d 624, 631 (2020); Patrick Dorrian, 
Washington State Jurors Not “Employees” Under Minimum Wage Law, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. 
REP. (Apr. 10, 2020, 11:04 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/daily-labor-
report/X35HB970000000?bna_news_filter=daily-labor-report#jcite (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).  
272. Dorrian, supra note 270; U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 267. 
273. How Much of the Cost of Living Is Covered by Minimum Wage?, DIVVY (Mar. 4, 2020), 
https://getdivvy.com/blog/minimum-wage-vs-living-wage/ [https://perma.cc/BB6B-X7QE]. 
Research suggests that even a more modest pay increase for jurors could encourage participation. The 
city of El Paso, for example, saw an increase in juror participation from 22% to 46% by increasing 
the level of juror pay from $6 to $40 per day over a two-year period. See Robert Walters & Mark 
Curriden, A Jury of One’s Peers? Investigating Underrepresentation in Jury Venires, 43 JUDGES’ J. 
17, 19–20 (2004) (noting that New York City saw a dramatic increase in juror participation rates, 
from 12% to 39%, after requiring that large businesses compensate employees for taking time off of 
work for jury service). 
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jury service would impose a more manageable burden on the many 
eligible Americans who cannot currently participate. Indeed, an added 
benefit of this reform would be the incremental increase in juror wages 
which would account for inflation and the increased cost of living across 
the country. 
This, of course, leaves open the question of how states—and the federal 
judiciary—might fund such reforms. At the federal level, juror pay is set 
by statute and funded by Congress.274 At the state level, funding sources 
vary. In Texas, for example, funding for jury service is provided at the 
county or city level.275 Beyond the reallocation of such budgets, states that 
currently utilize generous hardship funding may offer a model for reform. 
In Arizona, which enacted the Lengthy Trial Fund (discussed previously) 
as part of a wider effort to diversify its jury pool, funding is drawn from a 
$15 filing fee for every civil case.276 The fund carries a surplus277 and a 
majority of civil cases settle before trial, obviating the need for juries.278 
Indeed, if the vast majority of civil cases settle, with some resolving in 
bench trials,279 filing fee savings may at the very least help subsidize the 
allocation of minimum wage funds for those summoned for jury service—
not only in lengthy trials, but from the start of all trials. Beyond 
implementing an increase in jurors’ wages, some jurisdictions have found 
creative ways to augment support for eligible jurors of limited means. 
Certain counties, for example, have sought to offset jurors’ commuting 
burdens by compensating them for the cost of public transportation 
or parking.280 
 
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1871.  
275. See TEX. JUD. BRANCH, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, at vii 
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1437891/about-texas-courts-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ4L-
CCY3] (“Counties pay the operating costs of district courts, as well as the base salary of judges, full 
salaries of other staff, and operating costs for constitutional county courts, county courts at law, and 
justice courts. Cities finance all costs related to the operation of municipal courts, including judges’ 
salaries.”); Jury Service in Texas, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/about-texas-
courts/juror-information/jury-service-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/Z8HU-U4YH].  
276. Silverman, supra note 235, at 5–6. 
277. Id. 
278. Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better than Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html [https://perma.cc/3KN9-UBY6]. 
279. Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1071, 1074–75 (2019). 
Out of 274,362 total reported federal civil cases that were terminated in fiscal year 2015 (with the 
exception of land condemnation cases), 2,091 were tried by juries. Id. (citing ADMIN. OFF. OF THE 
U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2015, at tbl.4.10 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov 
/sites/default/files/table4.10_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP2U-MJAH]).  
280. See Jack Craver, Travis County Offers Free Bus Rides to Jurors, AUSTIN MONITOR (May 28, 
2019), https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2019/05/travis-county-offers-free-bus-rides-to-jurors/ 
[https://perma.cc/2HKQ-ZDXM]; Jury Duty Service, EL PASO CNTY., https://www.epcounty.com/ 
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The failure to support the material needs of citizens for the duration of 
jury service, more than anything, reflects a failure to value or prioritize 
the vital function that jurors play in the legal system. Moreover, it reflects 
a doctrinal blindness and practical indifference to the impact that disparate 
juror compensation has on judges’ and litigants’ ability to empanel 
representative juries. Bringing state juror compensation rates in line with 
the standards of the federal judiciary would represent a promising first 
step toward more broadly and uniformly recognizing the value of jurors’ 
labor. It would also represent recognition of the inextricable connection 
between people’s material well-being and capacity to contribute to a civic 
institution that demands significant temporal and intellectual investment. 
2. The Expansion of Support for Caretakers 
Loss of pay is not the only potential burden faced by a prospective 
juror. People have family members for whom they provide care that is not 
readily delegated. Historically, caregiving was viewed as a woman’s 
responsibility; women tended to both children and ailing parents while 
their husbands appeared in the jury box.281 In many parts of the country, 
women fought vigorously to participate as jurors, and were flatly rebuffed 
for nearly sixty years, even after gaining the right to vote.282 
As late as 1961, the United States Supreme Court declined to require 
that states empanel women and men on juries in equal number, since 
women were “still regarded as the center of home and family life.”283 
Though in later decisions the Court would hold that women should not be 
required to “opt-in” or “out” of jury service on the basis of sex due to the 
reinforcement of stereotypical gender roles, these decisions gave rise to a 
purportedly gender neutral “caregiver” exemption from service.284 
 
courts/juryservice.htm [https://perma.cc/B7Q7-T3SU]; Free Bus Transportation for Jury Duty, JURY 
DUTY: METRO. NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CNTY., https://juryduty.nashville.gov/resources/free-bus-
transportation-for-jury-duty/?doing_wp_cron=1596508248.5603349208831787109375 
[https://perma.cc/4SRK-MHJ2]. 
281. Ritter, supra note 21, at 485. 
282. Id. at 503. 
283. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (“We cannot say that it is constitutionally 
impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman should 
be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she herself determines that such service is 
consistent with her own special responsibilities.”); see also LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO BE LADIES 157 (1998) (noting that when Gwendolyn Hoyt moved to dismiss her venire on 
the ground that she was denied a constitutional right to a fair trial, the trial judge dramatically 
understated the percentage of eligible female jurors who had been summoned to court). 
284. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 (1979) (“[E]xempting all women because of the 
preclusive domestic responsibilities of some women is insufficient justification for their 
disproportionate exclusion on jury venires.”). 
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Today, many states offer an explicit exemption for those caring for 
children or the elderly.285 There is little uniformity, however, in the way 
that states approach this exemption. A minority of states explicitly limit 
the exemption to childcare obligations.286 Others have a designated 
exemption for breastfeeding mothers,287 and still others offer an 
exemption so broad that it could theoretically excuse all mothers from jury 
service.288 The inherent inconsistency that arises from judges’ exercising 
discretion in evaluating—and ultimately granting—caretaking excuses 
can lead some parents to avoid reporting to court altogether, out of 
concern they will not have recourse if their excusal is denied.289 
Even at present day, families that do not have the means to pay for in-
home or external caregivers often rely on women to assume these duties. 
Due, in part, to the pandemic’s closure of daycare centers and schools 
across the country,290 women left the American workforce in record 
 
285. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.106 (West 2020). 
286. CAL. CT. R. 2.1008 (d)(7); FLA. STAT. § 40.013 (4) (2021); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
305/10.2 (West 2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-860 (2021); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.106(a)(2); 
WYO. STAT ANN. § 1-11-104(a) (West 2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-1.1(a)(3) (2021); N.J. REV. 
STAT. § 2b:20-10(3) (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 10.050(4)–(5) (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
341.1(8) (2021). 
287. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4511(b) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-6(9) (2020); IDAHO CODE 
§ 2-212(3) (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.100 (West 2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-313(1) 
(2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 28(E)(2) (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-13-10.4 (2021); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 13-71-119.5(2.5) (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601(1) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78B-1-109(1)(a) (West 2021). 
288. ALA. CODE § 12-16-63(b)(2)(a) (2021); ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.030 (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 21-202(B)(4)(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(b) (2020); IOWA CODE 
§ 607A.6 (2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1213(2) (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234a, § 39 
(2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 494.430(1)(4) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 6.030(1)(c) (2020); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 500-A:11 (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-2(C)(1) (2021); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 517(2)(c) 
(Consol. 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-6(a) (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-11(2) (2021); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.14(5) (West 2020); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4503(3) (2021); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 9-10-9 (2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 962(5)(b) (2020); W. VA. CODE § 52-1-11(b) (2021); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 756.03(1)–(2) (West 2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-103 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-159 (2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:3042(F) (2021); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-
402(c)(1)–(2) (West 2021); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (3)(a) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-
103(b)(4) (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.100 (2021); IND. CODE § 33-28-5-18(c)(4)(A)–
(C) (2021). 
289. Mackenzie Mays, Mom on Jury Duty Didn’t Have Child Care. Judge Asked What if She ‘Got 
Hit by a Mack Truck,’ FRESNO BEE (Dec. 6, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.fresnobee.com/ 
news/local/article222568350.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2021). 
290. Eleni X. Karageorge, COVID-19 Recession Is Tougher on Women, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. 
STAT.: MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Sept. 2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2020/beyond-bls/covid-19-
recession-is-tougher-on-women.htm [https://perma.cc/NYW3-7793]; Alicia Sasser Modestino, Jamie 
Ladge & Alisa Lincoln, The Importance of Childcare in Reopening the Economy, ECONOFACT 
(July  29,  2020),  https://econofact.org/the-importance-of-childcare-in-reopening-the-economy 
[https://perma.cc/TH9F-LCB8] (summarizing a National Panel Survey of over 2,500 employed 
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number in 2020.291 An estimated 2.1 million women found themselves out 
of work during the first year of the pandemic, resulting in 5.4 million lost 
jobs since February of 2020. 
This, of course, is not a new phenomenon. Between 2015 and 2019, 
women have on average spent twice as much time caring for children as 
men have.292 And in 2012, approximately 28% of American children were 
being cared for by mothers who stayed primarily in the home, meaning a 
significant portion of the jury pool at any given moment would be 
precluded from serving as jurors due to childcare obligations.293 Even in 
pre-pandemic conditions, women who did not exclusively work from 
home but were employed in positions that allowed for a flexible workday 
could find themselves unable to serve on a jury due to childcare 
commitments.294 
For these reasons, blanket exemptions from jury service for caregivers 
can result in the disproportionate removal of women from venires.295 In 
Eugene, Oregon, for example, the cost of childcare for toddlers can be 
nearly twice as much as a year of public university tuition, and for every 
individual slot available at a preschool, there are eight children who need 
 
parents conducted between May and June of 2020 by Northeastern University); see also Marguerite 
Ward, The Pandemic Is Set to Shutter 40% of US Childcare Centers—and It Could Prove 
Catastrophic for the Careers of American Women, INSIDER (July 30, 2020, 2:54 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/pandemic-child-care-closures-could-be-terrible-for-womens-
careers-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/SPS6-T5UU]. 
291. Since February of 2020, women have reportedly lost over 5.4 million jobs. Claire Ewing-
Nelson, All of the Jobs Lost in December Were Women’s Jobs, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Jan. 
2021),  https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/December-Jobs-Day.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ 
8PZS-X79C].  
292. News Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., American Time Use Survey—2019 
Results (June 25, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF95-
N7A9] (noting that women on average dedicated 1.78 hours per day to childcare while men averaged 
0.90 hours per day). 
293. Jacob Galley, Stay-at-Home Mothers Through the Years, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.: 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Sept. 2014), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/beyond-bls/stay-at-home-
mothers-through-the-years.htm [https://perma.cc/SVF6-R48U]. 
294. Even beyond childcare responsibilities, women constitute a larger percentage of the working 
poor and part-time workforce than men—realities which may further detract from their ability to 
participate as jurors. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., REPORT NO. 1077, WOMEN IN THE LABOR 
FORCE:  A  DATABOOK  (2018),  https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-databook/2018/home. 
htm#technical-notes [https://perma.cc/N57Q-PF79]. Women of color, in particular, disparately earn 
lower wages. See generally Hadas Mandel & Moshe Semyonov, Going Back in Time? Gender 
Differences in Trends and Sources of the Racial Pay Gap, 1970 to 2010, 81 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1039, 
1041 (2016). 
295. See generally Kim Parker, Women More Than Men Adjust Their Careers for Family Life, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/01/women-more-than-
men-adjust-their-careers-for-family-life/ [https://perma.cc/K4TU-HZXU]. 
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care.296 Recognizing the prohibitive cost of daycare, and the fact that early 
childhood education resources are unlikely to be available on short notice 
and for short periods of time, California provides a supervised children’s 
waiting room to prospective jurors in need of such assistance.297 There are 
currently sixty-seven California courthouses that utilize and provide juror 
access to children’s waiting rooms of some kind.298 
Although not as expansive as California, other states have employed 
similar alternatives to blanket exemptions for caretakers. Colorado, for 
example, implemented the Family Friendly Courts Act, which 
recommends the use of children’s centers to address the problem that jury 
service poses for caregivers.299 There are currently two courthouses in 
Colorado that offer free, licensed daycare services to people involved in 
court proceedings, including jurors. In El Paso County, which has one 
such facility, most who rely on the service are of low income, and three-
quarters are single mothers.300 The daycare is staffed by a childcare 
nonprofit organization that operates on grants and community 
donations.301 In Washington, D.C., the Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia Child Care Center is available to the children of jurors, 
witnesses, and others between the ages of two and twelve who require 
supervision.302 The Center was founded by a volunteer group in 1974 
before the D.C. Courts administration assumed control of the program in 
the 1980s.303 In Orange County, Florida, the Orlando Day Nursery runs a 
center that offers drop-in childcare for those, including jurors, who have 
 
296.  Tatiana Parafiniuk-Talesnick, Child Care Options for Toddlers and Infants Scarce, Pricey 
in Lane County, REGISTER-GUARD (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.registerguard.com/news/20191003/ 
child-care-options-for-toddlers-and-infants-scarce-pricey-in-lane-county  [https://perma.cc/QTJ8-
LWKC]. 
297. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 70640(a) (West 2021) (“It is the policy of the state that each court shall 
endeavor to provide a children’s waiting room in each courthouse for children whose parents or 
guardians are attending a court hearing as a litigant, witness, or for other court purposes as determined 
by the court.”). 
298. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CHILDREN’S WAITING ROOMS: SIXTY-SEVEN CALIFORNIA 
COURTHOUSES HAVE CHILDREN’S WAITING ROOMS (2020).  
299. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3-113 (West 2021) (“[W]hich report was submitted by the 
Colorado supreme court family friendly facilities task force and which report recommended the 
establishment of children’s centers in courthouses.”). 
300. Lance Benzel, Free, Licensed Day Care Offered at El Paso County Courthouse, GAZETTE 
(July 27, 2018), https://gazette.com/news/free-licensed-day-care-offered-at-el-paso-county-
courthouse/article_2908c5a4-bd38-5a26-876e-40aef857899b.html [https://perma.cc/73WD-RW9N]. 
301. Id. 
302. SUPERIOR CT. OF D.C.: DC COURTS’ CHILD CARE CENTER: PARENT HANDBOOK 3 (2020), 
https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/matters-docs/Child-Care-Center-Handbook-Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/42CQ-RTCH]. 
303. Id.  
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business with the court.304 While there are a few other courthouse daycare 
centers scattered throughout the country, the vast majority of parents and 
caregivers have few or no alternatives when they are summoned for 
jury service.305 
This must change. The socio-economic, gender, and racial diversity of 
American juries can be enhanced by facilities and services that offer 
caregiving support to dependents. Adjustments in trial schedules, for 
instance, could accommodate school pick-up and drop-off times.306 And 
access to a designated childcare fund could aid those in a position to 
employ a backup caretaker for the duration of jury selection or a trial. A 
functional model for such an accommodation can be found in 
Minnesota.307 There, jurors who are stay-at-home caretakers receive 
reimbursement of up to $50 per day to offset the cost of a licensed daycare, 
or $40 per day to reduce the expense of hiring a babysitter.308 
This and the other cases highlighted above gesture toward a new 
paradigm of juror support that not only acknowledges but embraces 
prospective jurors as whole individuals—individuals with obligations and 
constraints whose personal and professional responsibilities do not 
disqualify them from fulfilling an essential civic duty. Once more, given 
the gendered and racialized dimensions of employment and care, 
universal reforms that tackle sources of hardship will have the added 
benefit of building juries whose diversity reflects that of the country. 
Further, lawyers are right to think that jurors will be distracted from trials 
by concerns about their jobs or the well-being of their dependents. 
Removing these concerns will translate to more focused juries. 
 
304. A Place for Children, NINTH JUD. CIR. CT. OF FLA., https://www.ninthcircuit.org/services/a-
place-for-children [https://perma.cc/9TAZ-6TBW]. 
305. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 298.  
306. See, e.g., Reduced Public Business Hours, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE W. DIST. OF ARK. (Mar. 
18, 2020), https://www.arwd.uscourts.gov/news/reduced-public-business-hours 
[https://perma.cc/HV3S-YD8P] (“Until further notice, the Western District of Arkansas’s public 
business hours for all divisions will be from 9:00 AM – 3:30 PM.”); Public Administrative Order 
Regarding Court Hours of Operation, No. 20-AO-0003-P (N.D. Iowa Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/USFEDCOURTS/2020/03/20/file_attachments/140734
7/Administrative%20Order%2020-AO-0003-P.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJU6-YCV4] (“Effective 
immediately the public hours for Court operations on regular business days at the Sioux City 
courthouse and the Cedar Rapids courthouse will be 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.”); General Order 
Regarding Court Operations Related to COVID-19, No. 20-06 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2020), 
http://www.kyed.uscourts.gov/kyed_GOs/gen20-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ3B-FH8R] (“Effective 
immediately, the Lexington Courthouse is open to the public from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., Eastern 
Time, Monday through Friday (excluding holidays) . . . .”). 
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3. Addressing the Uneven Economic Impact of the COVID-19 
Pandemic 
The socio-economic challenges associated with the American jury 
system were immense before 2020. The arrival of the COVID-19 
pandemic exacerbated old issues and introduced new ones. As legislators 
and government officials worked to limit the spread of COVID-19 
through social-distancing and shelter-in-place provisions (after the 
loosening of such protocols led to corresponding and distinct peaks in 
cases),309 the delay of criminal court proceedings was inevitable.310 
Businesses and corporations tried to curb their losses by adapting to the 
social and work environment changes COVID-19 created for Americans 
by utilizing video technology software, such as Zoom.311 This prompted 
some criminal judges and attorneys to consider resuming their own court 
business remotely, as a means of managing the growing backlog of 
criminal cases that accumulated during the pandemic.312 It should be clear, 
however, that these adaptive measures carried significant implications for 
a defendant’s right to a jury that represents a fair cross-section of 
the community. 
The most obvious impediment was limited access to functional 
broadband internet, which was the precondition for “remote” juries.313 
Seven percent of Americans do not use the internet,314 and, in large 
 
309. John Harrington & Hristina Byrnes, COVID-19 Reopening: Every State’s Social Distancing 
Measures, Restrictions on Movement, USA TODAY (June 18, 2020, 9:39 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/06/18/every-states-rules-for-reopening-and-social-
distancing/111909588/ [https://perma.cc/RV52-X6KD]. 
310. Jacob Gershman & Byron Tau, Coronavirus Disrupts U.S. Court System, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
17, 2020, 7:40 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-disrupts-u-s-court-system-
11584445222 [https://perma.cc/9FWG-EKN7] (providing an overview of issues for the U.S. court 
systems since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic); see also Michelle Casady, Texas Courts Re-
Closing Amid COVID-19 Spike, LAW 360 (June 29, 2020, 11:53 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1287555 [https://perma.cc/BD45-W2YK]. 
311. William Antonelli, What Is Zoom? A Comprehensive Guide to the Wildly Popular Video-
Chatting Service for Computers and Smartphones, INSIDER (Nov. 18, 2020, 7:52 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-zoom-guide [https://perma.cc/7GLT-78NW] (detailing 
what Zoom is and how to use the program); Dain Evans, How Zoom Became So Popular During 
Social Distancing, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/03/how-zoom-
rose-to-the-top-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/PAV4-2BZ6] (detailing 
reasons for Zoom’s growth in popularity during the COVID-19 pandemic).  
312. Matt Reynolds, Could Zoom Jury Trials Become the Norm During the Coronavirus 
Pandemic?, A.B.A. J. (May 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/could-
zoom-jury-trials-become-a-reality-during-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/7YYM-9BS4]. 
313. Paula Hinton & Tom Melsheimer, The Remote Jury Trial Is a Bad Idea, LAW 360 (June 9, 
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1279805/ [https://perma.cc/8TBA-MFRY]. 
314. Id.; see also Andrew Perrin & Sara Atske, 7% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet. Who Are 
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metropolitan areas, such as Dallas County, one in three families lack home 
internet access.315 Judge Emily Miskel, who conducted the first remote 
voir dire in a civil case,316 suggested offering socially-distanced, public 
areas, such as spaces within libraries or courthouses, where those without 
internet access could participate in jury selection proceedings and jury 
duty.317 Even for those with internet access, courts likely discovered that 
technical literacy is unevenly distributed in society, showing at the very 
least a generational bias. 
Some, however, have argued that technological solutions may facilitate 
more equitable jury trial proceedings in the long run.318 More widespread 
use of electronic communications and remote hearings, for example, 
could reduce court costs while facilitating the empanelment of jurors who 
possess the means to participate remotely.319 As juries returned to entirely 
in-person proceedings, some scholars feared that reporting and 
participation rates may have fallen to lower numbers than existed pre-
pandemic, due to concerns about new viral variants and other 
impediments to vaccine uptake that might further inhibit broad 
participation.320 
Though the pandemic’s impact on the jury system and civic 
participation more broadly is far from certain, a recent national poll 
conducted by the NCSC revealed concern about the viability of 
representative jury participation during the pandemic.321 Out of the 1,000 
 
They?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/22/some-
americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/HYH6-37XG]. 
315. Corbett Smith, A Third of Dallas Families Are Without Home Internet, Making Online 
Learning All the More Difficult, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 8, 2020, 7:45 PM), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/public-health/2020/05/08/a-third-of-dallas-families-are-without-
home-internet-making-online-learning-all-the-more-difficult/ [https://perma.cc/52HW-KDZF]. 
316. Nate Raymond, Texas Tries a Pandemic First: A Jury Trial by Zoom, REUTERS (May 18, 
2020, 4:19 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-courts-texas/texas-tries-a-
pandemic-first-a-jury-trial-by-zoom-idUSKBN22U1FE [https://perma.cc/C8NW-TQ9H]. 
317. Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., How State Courts Are Using Innovative Technologies and 
Responsible Health and Safety Practices to Resume Jury Trials, VIMEO, at 52:16 (May 22, 2020), 
https://vimeo.com/422780495 (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (remarks of Judge Emily Miskel, Collin 
Cnty. Tex. J.).  
318. Lucy Lang, Virtual Criminal Justice May Make the System More Equitable, WIRED (July 1, 
2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-virtual-criminal-justice-may-make-the-
system-more-equitable/ [https://perma.cc/J7YN-VQH6]. 
319. See id.  
320. Id.; see also James Paton & Bloomberg, Public Health Officials Warn About Slow Vaccine 
Rollout as Coronavirus Variants Multiply, FORTUNE (Jan. 18, 2021, 12:19 AM), 
https://fortune.com/2021/01/18/health-warning-slow-vaccine-rollout-coronavirus-variants-multiply/ 
[https://perma.cc/7JC6-XE55]. 
321. Memorandum from GBAO Strategies to Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. (June  22,  2020), 
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registered voters polled, at least 55% of respondents reported that they 
would not be able to participate in jury service because they either served 
as a primary caregiver to an elderly family member, could not secure 
childcare, or shared a household with someone with an underlying health 
condition which placed them at higher risk of a COVID-19 
complication.322 
Beyond the possibility of remote proceedings, the pandemic also 
exacerbated obstacles to jury service faced by women who serve as 
caregivers,323 even as in-person jury trials resumed. Over the course of the 
pandemic, women spent fifteen more hours per week on domestic labor 
than men.324 Furthermore, and drawing on the impact of past pandemics 
such as the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, women are more 
likely than men to make career sacrifices or pursue flexible jobs that 
accommodate childcare and housework.325 
All of this suggests that however the COVID-19 pandemic refigures 
trials, its effect on juries is unlikely to foster greater access to groups 
historically excluded on socio-economic grounds. Once more, it is likely 
that their excusal—due to caregiving responsibilities, poor internet 
connections, or lack of technical literacy—will be accepted in everyday 
proceedings as “for their own good” or “what’s best for the trial.” 
Accepting these new hardships or the deepening of old ones only furthers 
the sclerosis of an American legal system that for too long has asked what 
jurors can do for it and not what it can do for jurors. Alongside the increase 
 
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/41001/NCSC-Juries-Post-Pandemic-World-
Survey-Analysis.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ 5UY4-TDBC].  
322. Id. 
323. See America’s Mothers Are in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/04/parenting/working-moms-coronavirus.html 
[https://perma.cc/NV4S-R5UT]. 
324. Matt Krentz, Emily Kos, Anna Green & Jennifer Garcia-Alonso, Easing the COVID-19 
Burden on Working Parents, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (May 21, 2020), 
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/helping-working-parents-ease-the-burden-of-covid-19 
[https://perma.cc/Q25F-J54M]. 
325. Helen Lewis, The Coronavirus Is a Disaster for Feminism, THE ATL. (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/03/feminism-womens-rights-coronavirus-
covid19/608302/ [https://perma.cc/K2D7-PJAM]; see also Mark Miller, Female Workers Could Take 
Another Pandemic Hit: To Their Retirements, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/business/women-retirement-covid-social-security.html 
[https://perma.cc/FLJ4-5NU3]; VICTORIA M. DEFRANCESCO SOTO, Y.W.C.A. USA, AMERICA’S 
RECOVERY FROM THE 2020 “SHECESSION”: BUILDING A FEMALE FUTURE OF CHILDCARE AND WORK 
6 (2020), https://www.ywca.org/wp-content/uploads/COVID_WOMEN-CHILDCARE_R4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9YF-9UH8] (“The rates of unemployment have been especially steep among 
women of color. Compared to 13 percent unemployment for white women, Latina unemployment is 
nearing 20 percent, followed by 16 percent unemployment among Black and Asian American women. 
Over 60 percent of women of color have lost their hours, faced a pay cut, or been laid off or 
furloughed.” (citations omitted)). 
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in compensation and expansion of caregiving, state and federal courts 
must seriously consider that preserving the constitutional right to a trial 
by jury necessitates the roll-out of public broadband and publicly-funded 
resources for building technical literacy. If the trial is to go digital, then 
we have a moral imperative to cultivate a diverse digital citizenry. 
CONCLUSION 
Though property requirements have been consigned to the dustbin of 
American legal history, socio-economic exclusion remains a pernicious 
feature of the jury trial. One need not seek an explanation for its 
persistence in simple stories about discriminatory prosecutors and 
“recalcitrant[]” citizens eager to avoid jury service.326 The empirical 
evidence marshalled in this Article suggests that contradictory judicial 
motives to be benevolent and vigilant, deference to advantage-seeking 
attorneys, and the well-founded anxieties of low-income people mix to 
produce an everyday process whereby otherwise capable prospective 
jurors do not make the cut—for “their own good.” The implications are 
not only homogenous juries but juries in which members of particular 
groups do not feel that they can participate fully in the deliberative 
process. The jury is a critical resource for the American legal system, and 
we are not investing in it. 
But we could. This Article has described numerous experiments, large 
and small, where courts are making socio-economic inclusion a priority. 
Their example suggests that true benevolence is not the refusal to impose 
a heavy financial load on jurors but the acknowledgement that the load 
must be lightened—for all. The COVID-19 pandemic may at first have 
seemed like one more enormous problem for the jury trial. But it can 
instead present an opportunity if at last we see that there is a human 
infrastructure to the American legal system, and it must be the target of 
sustained and generous public investment. The result would be a break 
with centuries of socio-economic exclusion and a turn toward juries that 
look, talk, think, and act in all the ways characteristic of our diverse 
society. We must empower more poor and working people, who are 
disproportionately the objects of the justice system, to participate actively 
in the process of doing justice. 
 
 
326. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 126 (2003). 
